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ARTICLES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF CLIENT-
CENTERED DECISION MAKING
Todd A. Berger *
INTRODUCTION
Some years ago in a courtroom in Philadelphia, I found myself
in a rather troubling predicament. My client threatened to stab
me with a pen. I was his defense attorney.'
My client had been charged with a gunpoint robbery. He was
picked out of a random photo array by the complainant a few
days after the incident occurred. If we lost the trial, he was going
to receive a sentence of at least ten to twenty years in prison.
* Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. I am extremely grateful
to the 2015 Clinical Writers' Workshop for giving me the opportunity to present this par-
ticular piece. I owe a special thanks to Professors Keith Findley, Jenny Roberts, Vida
Johnson, and Joy Radice. Additional thanks are owed to Professors Lauryn Gouldin, Ann
Pfeiffer, Jason Hoge, J.C. Lore, and Aliza Milner. I am extremely grateful to Megan
Brooks, Victoria Radcliffe, and Cory Schoonmaker for their excellent research assistance.
Lastly, a special thank you is owed to Hedimay Berger and Beverly Beaver for their edit-
ing, feedback, and general willingness to discuss this article far more than either of them
would have liked.
1. The author is mindful of the concern raised by some legal ethicists that publically
disclosing certain aspects of client representation without the client's consent may violate
the ethical prohibition against disclosing client confidences. See Binny Miller, Telling Sto-
ries About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 48-52
(2000); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). In
recognition of this concern, facts have been altered in such a way that it would be virtually
impossible to identify the client. As a result, the author believes that the story recounted
in this article's introduction does not run afoul of existing ethical rules. Further, certain
facts have been changed in order to more plainly illustrate this article's ultimate point
with respect to the intersection of client-centered counseling and the constitutional guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel.
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I believed that the best trial theory was one of misidentifica-
tion, in which the unfortunate client, without any provable con-
nection to the area where the robbery took place, happened to be
randomly picked out of a photo array. However, my client also in-
sisted he had a witness who could prove it was impossible for him
to have committed the crime.
I interviewed his proposed witness. The witness told me that
she was with the client at a local bar on the night in question, but
that the client left the bar about fifteen minutes prior to the time
that the robbery occurred. The bar was about two blocks from the
scene of the crime.
After interviewing the witness, it became clear that far from
being helpful, her testimony was actually inculpatory. For start-
ers, her testimony actually placed my client in the vicinity of the
robbery. In fact, except for the victim's identification of my client,
which I felt I could persuasively attack, the prosecution had no
evidence that placed my client in the area where the crime oc-
curred.
Therefore, if I called this witness, I, rather than the prosecu-
tion, would have presented evidence that could be viewed as cor-
roboration of the victim's identification of my client as the robber.
Moreover, the witness's testifying that the client left the bar
shortly before the robbery, and her being unable to account for
the client's whereabouts during the robbery, actually would have
suggested that the client had the opportunity to commit the
crime.
I walked my client through how I thought a jury would process
his proposed witness's testimony. He nevertheless insisted that I
call his witness. For reasons that were never entirely clear, the
client seemed to attach a value to the witness's testimony that I
simply could not see. Frankly, I thought she would have made an
excellent witness for the prosecution.
Following cross-examination in which I challenged the ability
of the complainant to make an accurate identification, my client
demanded that I call his witness to the stand. I explained to my
client once again why it was not a good idea to call this witness.
He disagreed and told me I should. I refused. He insisted-it was
his witness, his right to a defense, and it was his freedom we
1090 [Vol. 50:1089
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were talking about. After all, he was the one staring down ten to
twenty years in prison, not me. I still refused. Then he threatened
to stab me if I did not accede to his wish.
The above situation highlights one of the most vexing quanda-
ries in American criminal law. Simply put, when the attorney and
the client disagree concerning a matter of trial tactics and strate-
gy, who should make the ultimate decision?2
The United States Supreme Court held in Jones v. Barnes that
there are four decisions that relate to the "fundamental" rights of
the criminal defendant and are therefore exclusively the defend-
ant's to make.3 These decisions are whether to plead guilty,
whether to waive a jury trial, whether to testify, and whether to
appeal.4 Beyond these decisions, which are deemed fundamental
and personal to the defendant, almost all other decisions are con-
sidered "strategic" or "tactical" decisions and fall within the law-
yer's control.'
Further, while current ethics rules are slightly more expansive,
they nevertheless track closely to the Jones view of the allocation
of attorney/client decision-making authority.6 Therefore, with re-
spect to both constitutional jurisprudence and ethical guidelines,
criminal defense attorneys are generally given wide-ranging deci-
sion-making authority over strategic and tactical decisions during
the trial process.'
2. Indeed, "[]egal scholars vigorously disagree about the appropriate role for the
lawyer in wielding decisionmaking power in the attorney-client relationship, a disagree-
ment that has spawned a host of articles and books." Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood,
The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An
Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998).
3. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
4. Id.
5. See Rodney J. Uphoff, Strategic Decisions in the Criminal Case: Who's Really Call-
ing the Shots?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1999, at 4, 5 (referencing the four fundamental rights
that can only be exercised with the consent of the accused as explained by the United
States Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes and noting, "[b]eyond these fundamental mat-
ters, however, the lawyer is responsible for all tactical and strategic decisions") [hereinaf-
ter Uphoff, Strategic Decisions]. Part I of this article provides a more complete overview of
the proper allocation of decision-making authority between the lawyer and client as re-
flected in current decisional law.
6. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Counsel or Client-Who's in Charge?, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2008, at 34, 34 (stating that, with respect to ethics rules, their "allocation of
authority to the client is consistent with the Supreme Court's view in Jones v. Barnes").
7. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751; see also Joy & McMunigal, supra note 6, at 34-35 (pos-
iting that current ethics standards "adopt a view of defense counsel expressed by former
Chief Justice Warren Burger that once the defendant hires counsel or receives appointed
2016] 1091
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Nevertheless, the above jurisprudence does not end the discus-
sion. Even if an attorney has the legal authority to make a par-
ticular decision over his or her client's objection, an important
question remains: should defense counsel nonetheless yield to the
client's wishes regarding a particular question of strategy if a
disagreement arises?
Legal scholars have looked at two primary models of lawyer de-
cision making in an attempt to answer this question.8 These are
(1) the "traditional" lawyer-centered model and (2) the client-
centered lawyering model.9 The lawyer-centered model vests pri-
mary decision-making control with the lawyer.10 Unlike the law-
yer-centered model, however, the theory of client-centered law-
yering provides that the client, and not the lawyer, makes all
decisions that are likely to have a substantial legal or non-legal
impact on the client's life.'
counsel, 'the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the attorney").
8. See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that there are "two major ap-
proaches" to resolving conflicting views regarding the proper allocation of decision-making
responsibility within the lawyer-client relationship and noting the two models are "the
traditional, lawyer-centered model and the participatory, client-centered approach").
9. Id.
10. See Uphoff, Strategic Decisions, supra note 5, at 5 ("According to the traditional
view, once a criminal defendant makes the decision to retain counsel--or to accept an ap-
pointed lawyer-the defendant's role is largely passive.").
11. See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN & JEAN M. CARY, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CLIENT
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND DECISION-MAKING: FOR CLINICAL PROGRAMS AND
PRACTICAL-SKILLS COURSES 7 (2009) (stating that, with respect to client-centered lawyer-
ing, "[t]he client is given primary decision-making power throughout the representation,
and the lawyer is obligated to make every reasonable effort to accede to the client's deci-
sions about the end and means of the representation"). This article uses the phrases cli-
ent-centered lawyering, client-centered representation, and client-centered counseling in-
terchangeably. For reasons expounded upon in Part II, this article's discussion of client-
centered lawyering refers to the most widely used approach to this particular lawyering
orientation, which was first proposed by Professors David Binder and Susan Price in their
1977 work, Legal Interviewing and Counseling. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). Succes-
sive versions of the text have been titled, Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Ap-
proach, and it is now in its third edition. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (3d ed. 2012). It should be noted that the
most commonly referenced model of client-centered representation involves two distinct
components. The first component relates to the manner in which the attorney provides the
client with advice regarding important decisions. See id. at 335. In terms of how advice
should be given, while the client-centered model does not require that a lawyer refrain
from offering a client his or her opinion, "it discourages lawyers from 'taking the lead' in
rendering opinions about the proper decision the client should make." See HERMAN &
CARY, supra, at 8; see also BINDER ET AL., supra, at 335-38. The second component of cli-
ent-centered representation relates to what can be referred as its decision-making compo-
nent. See BINDER ET AL., supra, at 336. The decision-making aspect of client-centered rep-
resentation once again provides that it is the client and not the lawyer who should make
1092 [Vol. 50:1089
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Since the introduction of client-centered lawyering to the law
school curriculum more than thirty-five years ago, it has become
the predominant model for teaching lawyering theory, particular-
ly within the context of clinical legal education.12 Despite this fact,
proponents of client-centered lawyering have generally failed to
account for how the decision-making component of client-centered
representation intersects with the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel."1 Specifically, the construct of
client-centered lawyering has failed to address whether the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel may be
violated when defense counsel acquiesces to a client's strategic
demands. In other words, does the constitutionally prescribed
all important decisions in the client's case. See HERMAN & CARY, supra, at 10; BINDER ET
AL., supra, at 318, 323. As this article progresses, it will address the constitutionality of
the decision-making aspect of client-centered representation and not the constitutionality
of the manner in which the client-centered lawyer should provide the client with legal ad-
vice. For a discussion of whether the advice giving component of client-centered represen-
tation is consistent with the Sixth Amendments guarantee of effective assistance of coun-
sel, see Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-
Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998).
12. See supra note 11; see also Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural
Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 370 (2006) ("Introduced
by David Binder and Susan Price in 1977 in a groundbreaking interviewing and counsel-
ing textbook, the client-centered approach helped fill a curricular void in the growing clini-
cal legal education movement, and quickly emerged as the leading model of client counsel-
ing taught in American law schools.") (citations omitted). This is not to suggest that the
lawyer-centered and client-centered approaches are the only lawyering philosophies being
taught in American law schools or employed by practitioners. In recent years, the "collabo-
rative model" of decision making has emerged as an alternative approach. The collabora-
tive model represents a middle ground between the lawyer-dominated and client-centered
models of representation. Under the collaborative model, the client controls decisions, but
the lawyer provides advice to the client in a more directed manner than under the classic
Binder/Price Model of client-centered counseling. See id. at 10. It should be noted that to
the extent to which the collaborative model vests ultimate decision-making control with
the client, even over the lawyer's objections, the collaborative model is subject to the same
concerns regarding its compatibility with the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel that will be detailed in Parts III and IV of this article. Further, other
legal commentators have argued that there may be occasions in which it is more, or less
appropriate to employ one decision-making model over another. This may, in part, depend
on the particular needs or expectations of the client, the particular subject matter of the
representation, the lawyer's role in the representation, the stage of the litigation, or the
consequences at stake. See id.
13. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in relevant part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his [defense]." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The actual text of the Amendment
uses the British spelling "defence" as opposed to the modern American spelling "defense."
In McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court noted that in order to give meaning to the
right to counsel, "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). Parts III and V of this article provide a more detailed dis-
cussion of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
2016] 1093
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel serve as a limitation
placed on the client-centered ideal that clients should exercise fi-
nal decision-making control over all important strategic and tac-
tical matters during the trial process?
Consequently, in answering the above question, this article's
principal objective is to fill what has otherwise been a void in the
theory of client-centered lawyering. Indeed, other scholars have
explored the intersection of client-centered representation and
the allocation of attorney/client decision making when a disa-
greement arises between the lawyer and the client. 14 Unlike other
scholarly works, however, this article thoroughly addresses the
specific question of whether the guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel is violated when the lawyer yields decision-making
control to the client, and how the answer to that question impacts
the theory of client-centered lawyering.is
14. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Wit-
ness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 764-65
(2000) [hereinafter Uphoff, Tactical Choices] (exploring how the traditional and client-
centered lawyering models answer the question of whether it is the lawyer or the client
who has the final say when it comes to calling a witness during a criminal trial); Uphoff &
Wood, supra note 2, at 5-7 (examining the views of over 700 public defenders expressed
through survey data about whether the lawyer or the client should have the final say on a
wide range of decisions made at the trial stage when the lawyer and client disagree).
15. The question of whether acceding to a client's strategic preferences is violative of
the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel was addressed, to a limited
extent, by Professor Rodney Uphoff. See Uphoff, Tactical Choices, supra note 14, at 792.
Professor Uphoff concluded that judicial opinions generally allow for lawyers to accede to
their client's wishes with respect to strategic and tactical decisions. Id. This conclusion is
indeed correct. However, unlike Professor Uphoffs article, this article explores many of
the same cases, as well as similar cases, and explains why those cases were wrongly de-
cided. Further, this article details why defense counsel may be compelled to overrule a cli-
ent's strategic preference based on the Supreme Court's seminal case of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). Additionally, Professor Marla L. Mitchell addressed
the intersection of the effective assistance of counsel and control over attorney/client deci-
sion making in a footnote in a 1995 review of a legal ethics book. Marla L. Mitchell, Be-
yond a Book Review: Using Clinical Scholarship in Our Teaching, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 251,
259 n.25 (1995) (reviewing RODNEY UPHOFF, ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS (1995)). Professor Mitchell
ultimately reaches a similar conclusion to the one reached in this article. Id. Professor
Mitchell's treatment of this particular legal issue, while valuable, is presented through a
more abbreviated analysis than takes place in this article (which is certainly understand-
able given the context in which Professor Mitchell was writing). To that end, this article
more completely addresses the question of whether a lawyer's acquiescence to a client's
strategic demands can violate the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of coun-
sel by deconstructing those cases which hold the opposite, explaining why those cases are
wrongly decided, and why existing constitutional jurisprudence sometimes compels the
opposite conclusion. Moreover, unlike other works, this article synthesizes its conclusions
squarely within the framework of client-centered lawyering. Justin F. Maceau has ex-
plored the intersection of client-centered representation and the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel in the specific context of presenting mitigating evidence during the penal-
[Vol. 50:10891094
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With this in mind, this work demonstrates that the decision of
a client-centered advocate to yield to his or her client's preference
regarding important questions of trial strategy or tactics may be
entirely consistent with the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of ef-
fective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, this article also
demonstrates that a core tenet of client-centered representation,
relating to the proper allocation of attorney/client decision-
making authority, is at times limited by the same guarantee. In
such instances, a lawyer may be required to overrule the client's
strategic or tactical preference and, in fact, adopt a lawyer-
centered approach to decision making.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview
of existing legal authority in terms of the proper allocation of de-
cision-making responsibility between the lawyer and the client.
Part II describes the two primary types of lawyering models that
speak to whether it is the lawyer or the client who should have
the final say regarding matters of trial strategy. Part III provides
an overview of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective as-
sistance of counsel. Part IV details how the decision-making as-
pect of the client-centered lawyering model intersects with that
guarantee.
ty phase of a capital trial. See Justin F. Marceau, Exploring the Intersection of Effective-
ness & Autonomy in Capital Sentencing, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 183, 186-87 (2006). Specifical-
ly, Maceau suggests that blind adherence to a client's request not to present mitigation
evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial-which may be considered somewhat
related to client-centered representation-violates the guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel. Id at 208. In this regard, Maceau's focus is on the Sixth Amendment's require-
ment that the lawyer provide the client with a sufficient degree of information to allow the
client to make an informed decision over which the client has ultimate control. Id. Howev-
er, unlike Maceau's work, this article addresses a different factual and legal question, i.e.,
assuming the client has been properly advised with respect to a decision over which the
lawyer, and not the client, retains ultimate control, how does the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel limit the client-centered lawyer's ability to allow
the client to make the ultimate decision? Professor Steven Zeidman has likewise raised
concerns regarding the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
and client-centered representation, but in the context of giving the client advice relating to
a guilty plea. See Zeidman, supra note 11, at 849. Specifically, Professor Zeidman notes
that the dominant Binder/Price model of client-centered lawyering dictates that advice
giving is permitted, but not required. Id. at 878-79. As a result, the type of client-centered
lawyering proposed in the Binder/Price model is inconsistent with the guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel required when counseling a client to accept or reject a plea bar-
gain, which is entirely the client's prerogative. In this sense, Professor Zeidman's focus is
on the counseling aspect of client-centered representation during the plea bargaining
stage of a criminal trial and with respect to a decision over which the client retains ulti-
mate control. Id. at 843, 849. As discussed in note 11, unlike Professor Zeidman's work,
this article's focus is on the decision-making aspect of client-centered representation dur-
ing the actual criminal trial itself when looking at a decision over which the lawyer, and
not the client, has final decision-making authority. See id. at 847-49.
20161 1095
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I. ALLOCATING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY: LEGAL DOCTRINE
The following part explores the legal authority that defines the
contours of attorney/client control over the decision-making pro-
cess during the criminal trial. This issue is explored from the per-
spective of both decisional law and ethical guidelines.
In terms of decisional law, as outlined in Subpart A, courts
have generally addressed the question of attorney/client control
from the perspective of whether the defendant has the constitu-
tional right to make certain decisions." While ethics rules may
give clients greater decision-making authority by limiting the
number of decisions over which the attorney has exclusive con-
trol, ethics rules, as outlined in Subpart B, obviously cannot re-
move decisions that the client has a constitutional right to make
from the ambit of client control.17
A. Decisional Law
In light of the above, the following discussion of constitutional
jurisprudence represents the minimum amount of authority that
the defendant must be given with respect to his or her right to
control strategic and tactical decisions made during trial."8
1. Jones v. Barnes Limits the Client's Decision-Making Power
Of course, the criminal defendant can maintain ultimate deci-
sion-making control over all decisions at trial by completely waiv-
ing the right to counsel and representing him or herself.9
16. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6(a), at 770-73, 783-86
(3d ed. 2007) (providing an extensive overview of both federal and state court decisions
exploring whether it is the criminal defendant who has a constitutional right to make a
broad range of decisions that are a part of the trial process).
17. See Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance -
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647, 663-64 (2013) ("States are free to specify
rules of professional responsibility for their lawyers that are more demanding than the
constitutional minimum.").
18. Id.
19. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817, 833-34 (1975) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment allows the defendant to completely waive the right to counsel and represent
himself in a criminal trial).
[Vol. 50:10891096
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If the defendant elects to be represented by counsel, however,
the defendant's right to exercise ultimate decision-making au-
thority is much more constrained.20 In terms of the allocation of
attorney/client decision-making authority, perhaps the most im-
portant judicial decision is the United State Supreme Court's
1983 decision in Jones v. Barnes.2 The specific issue presented in
Jones was whether defense counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance of counsel by refusing the client's request to raise certain
issues on appeal.22 Or said another way, is a defense attorney re-
quired to argue every non-frivolous claim that the client wishes to
present?"3
In concluding that appellate counsel was not so required, the
Supreme Court identified four specific decisions that it deemed
"fundamental," and therefore the ultimate authority over these
decisions belongs exclusively to the accused.24
As noted in this article's introduction, the Jones court identi-
fied the following four such decisions: (1) whether to plead guilty,
20. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 746, 749-50. The vast majority of decisions addressing the issue of attor-
ney/client control typically arise in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.6(a). In the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, when defense counsel makes a decision that the defendant claims is re-
served for him or her alone, the defendant's argument is essentially that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel was violated in that "the failure
to perform in accord with the obligation would constitute incompetent performance, possi-
bly leading to the reversal of any subsequent conviction of the client." Id. § 11.6(a) n.4.
However, this is not the only context in which the issue of attorney/client control arises. It
may also arise through a motion for substitute counsel when the defendant feels that the
attorney has or is exercising illegitimate control over some matter. The same reason may
be asserted by a defendant seeking a continuance in order to replace retained counsel. Id.
Regardless of the procedural posture in which such claims are made, courts tend to apply
the same reasoning to the issue of attorney/client control. See id. ("Although the difference
in procedural setting could conceivably influence a court's analysis of the client-control
issue, the courts have tended to treat the issue as basically the same whether presented in
one procedural context or another. Rulings recognizing attorney or client control with re-
spect to a particular defense decision will be carried over from one procedural context to
another."). As a result, regardless of the procedural context in which the claim is made,
the primary issue for a court in deciding an issue of client control is simply to determine if
the decision in question implicates a fundamental right that belongs to the client or in-
volves a tactical decision that belongs to the lawyer. Therefore, for the purposes of this ar-
ticle's discussion concerning how various cases have decided the issue of attorney/client
control, the particular procedural posture in which the issue was raised is immaterial in
determining whether the authority to make any particular decision belongs to the attor-
ney or the client.
23. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 749-54.
24. See id. at 751.
20161 1097
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(2) whether to waive a jury, (3) whether to testify on his or her
own behalf, or (4) whether to take an appeal.25 However, beyond
decisions that are deemed fundamental, defense counsel has the
right to make all tactical and strategic decisions, even over the
client's objection.26
Indeed, following Jones, once the defendant has agreed to be
represented by counsel, "[t]he attorney has the authority to make
tactical decisions with which the client disagrees."27 Courts have
further observed, "[t]he client's expressed disagreement with
counsel's tactical decisions cannot somehow convert the matter
into one that must be decided by the client."28
25. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring), ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2, 21-2.2 (2d. 1980)). It should be noted that
because the defendant has the authority to make the ultimate decision concerning wheth-
er to plead guilty, defense counsel is not permitted to usurp that right by engaging in con-
duct that is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. In Brookhart v. Janis, the United
States Supreme Court held that defense counsel could not enter an agreement with the
state, without the defendant's informed consent, that he would neither offer evidence on
the defendant's behalf nor cross-examine any of the State's witnesses if the state made a
prima facie showing of guilt. 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). The defendant himself desired to plead
not guilty, but defense counsel had accepted a procedure largely inconsistent with such a
plea. See id. The procedure accepted by defense counsel was characterized by Justice Har-
lan, in his concurring opinion, as having "amounted almost to a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere." Id. at 9 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751. In citing with approval to ABA Criminal Justice
Standard, Defense Function 4-5.2, the Jones Court noted that-with the exception of the
decisions to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, or testify-"strategic and tactical decisions are
the exclusive province of the defense counsel, after consultation with the client." Id. at 753
n.6. Further, the Court held that "[w]ith the exception of these specified fundamental deci-
sions, an attorney's duty is to take professional responsibility for the conduct of the case,
after consulting with his client." Id. This is not to suggest hat decisions that are deemed
matters of trial strategy and tactics are necessarily unrelated to a defendant's constitu-
tional rights. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal
citations omitted) ("Criminal defendants possess essentially two categories of constitu-
tional rights: those which are waivable by defense counsel on the defendant's behalf, and
those which are considered 'fundamental' and personal to defendant, waivable only by the
defendant. Generally included in the former are matters which primarily involve trial
strategy and tactics. Examples of such matters are what evidence should be introduced,
what stipulations should be made, what objections should be raised, and what pre-trial
motions should be filed. Examples of fundamental decisions which only the defendant is
empowered to waive are entry of a guilty plea, waiver of a jury trial, and whether to pur-
sue an appeal."); see also State v. Williams, 794 N.E.2d 27, 48-49 (Ohio 2003) (quoting
State v. Keith, 684 N.E.2d 47 (1997)) (holding that "[n]onfundamental rights, those rights
that primarily involve trial strategy and tactics, are waivable by defense counsel on the
defendant's behalf').
27. Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2008); see also Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96
F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that "as a general matter, it is not inappropriate for
counsel, after consultation with the client, to override the wishes of the client when exer-
cising professional judgment regarding 'non-fundamental' issues").
28. Bell v. United States, No. PJM 13-1682, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171705, at *11 n.4
1098 [Vol. 50:1089
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2. The Supreme Court's Reluctance to Extend the Defendant's
Decision-Making Power
Unfortunately, Supreme Court jurisprudence has done little to
illuminate what exactly separates a decision that is deemed fun-
damental from a decision that is merely a question of trial strate-
gy and tactics. As one legal commentator has noted:
The Supreme Court's explanations of why particular decisions are
for counsel or client have been brief and conclusionary. Decisions
within the client's control are simply described as involving "funda-
mental rights," while those within the lawyer's control are said to
involve matters requiring the "superior ability of trained counsel" in
assessing "strategy."
To that end, beyond the four decisions the Jones Court deemed
to be fundamental, the Supreme Court has been exceedingly re-
luctant to extend the scope of the criminal defendant's decision-
making power. In fact, beyond the decisions in Jones, the Su-
preme Court has only identified-and in dicta no less-one other
decision that belongs exclusively to the defendant-the decision
to waive the right to be present at trial.
In all other cases in which the Supreme Court has been asked
to determine whether a particular decision was one of tactics (and
therefore reserved to the lawyer) or a fundamental decision (and
therefore reserved to the defendant), the Court has determined
that the particular decision in question was tactical in nature and
(D. Md. Dec. 8, 2014), dismissed, 599 F. App'x 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
29. Kenneth P. Troccoli, Control Over the Defense: Representing Zacarias Moussaoui,
33 CHAMPION 30, 34 (2009) (quoting LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.6(c)).
30. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) (citing Cross v. United States,
325 F.2d 629, 630-33 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court
arguably extended, to a limited extent, the rights of criminal defendants in the context of
attorney/client control without directly extending the defendant's decision-making author-
ity. In Strickland, the Supreme Court held in very general language that defense counsel
has an obligation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel to consult with the defendant regarding important strategic decisions, even
though the lawyer retains the ultimate authority to make those decisions. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting defense counsel's "duties to consult with
the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course of the prosecution"); see also Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77
F.3d 1425, 1436 (3d Cir. 1996) (positing that the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland
imposed on defense counsel "[t]he requirement that counsel consult with his or her client
concerning issues on which counsel has the final word").
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therefore fell within the purview of the attorney's control. These
decisions include: calling a possible witness (other than the de-
fendant to testify at trial),"' forgoing cross-examination of a wit-
ness,32 deciding not to disclose the identity of certain witnesses
before trial,33 making decisions related to scheduling matters,34
stipulating to the admission of certain evidence at trial,35 making
a contemporaneous evidentiary objection,3" seeking to bar the in-
troduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence,3" seeking to
dismiss an indictment because the grand jury was unconstitu-
tionally selected," having the defendant wear civilian clothes ra-
ther than prison garb during trial,39 moving to strike an improper
31. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418 ("Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which coun-
sel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer's decision to forgo
cross-examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to
disclose the identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial.").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000) (holding that "[s]cheduling matters are
plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls" and defense coun-
sel could properly waive the 180-day time period in which the defendant must be brought
to trial as specified within the Interstate Agreement on Detainers).
35. Id. However, defense counsel cannot stipulate to the introduction of evidence in
such a way that doing so amounts to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. See
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966); see also supra note 25.
36. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 450-52 (1965). The Henry Court held only
that the decision whether to object to the introduction of a piece of evidence should be con-
sidered a matter of strategy. Id. at 451. However, in reaching this decision, the Henry
Court noted:
Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an
accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the ac-
cused from asserting constitutional claims, we think that the deliberate by-
passing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial
strategy would have that effect in this case.
Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted). As a result, some courts have read Henry in a broader
fashion than simply relating to the contemporaneous-objection rule and believe it stands
for the proposition that the selection of a given theory of defense is likewise a matter of
trial strategy that is reserved for defense counsel. See United States v. Wadsworth, 830
F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) (referencing Henry v. Mississippi for the proposition that
"[i]t is equally clear that appointed counsel, and not his client, is in charge of the choice of
trial tactics and the theory of defense"). Further, while the United States Supreme Court
has never explicitly addressed this issue, in addition to Henry, some legal commenters
have suggested that because the Supreme Court held in Jones "that defendants do not
have the right to dictate issues for their lawyers to present on appeal, it would appear that
there is no constitutional right to control case theory at the trial level." Binny Miller, Give
Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV.
485, 509 n.148 (1994).
37. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 74 (1977) (Miranda violation).
38. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 266 (1973).
39. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
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jury instruction,° allowing a federal magistrate judge and not a
federal district court judge to conduct voir dire and jury selec-
tion,4 1 and after consulting with the defendant who refuses to ei-
ther approve or disapprove of counsel's strategy, conceding the
defendant's guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial.4"
3. Lower Federal and State Court Decisions Provide Attorneys
with Broad Decision-Making Authority
Of course, one cannot expect the United States Supreme Court
to render an opinion regarding every decision on which a lawyer
and client are likely to disagree and to determine which party
gets to make the final decision. Unfortunately, as stated above,
the Supreme Court has provided little guidance to lower courts in
terms of how to decide whether a given decision implicates a fun-
damental choice of the defendant's, or instead is a tactical deci-
sion that belongs to defense counsel.43 Nevertheless, when decid-
ing whether the lawyer or the client has the final say on any
given decision, lower federal and state courts have generally em-
ployed four different rationales.
First, courts have concluded that decisions relating to the ob-
jective of the representation are uniquely personal to the defend-
40. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982).
41. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008).
42. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004). Nixon's lawyer theorized that conceding
guilt during the guilt phase of the trial would prevent the presentation of inconsistent evi-
dence during the penalty phase and therefore minimize the defendant's chances of receiv-
ing the death penalty. However, despite the fact Nixon was repeatedly consulted by his
lawyer regarding this strategy, Nixon was verbally unresponsive and never approved, nor
protested, defense counsel's decision. Id. at 181. The United States Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue of whether defense counsel's concession of guilt over the defend-
ant's express objection is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea (a fundamental right
reserved only for the defendant). See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966); see also su-
pra note 25 and accompanying text. And the Nixon decision does little to provide lower
courts with meaningful guidance with respect to this issue. This is because, to the extent
Nixon provides meaningful guidance to lower courts, the decision may be relevant only
when the defendant is charged with a capital offense and the defendant is consulted and
refuses to make a decision. In noting that the Nixon decision was indeed very narrow, the
Colorado Supreme Court explained Nixon by noting, "[a]s illustrated by the holding, both
the fact that capital cases present defense attorneys with different strategic decisions than
do other cases and the defendant's silence were critical to the Court's conclusion." See Peo-
ple v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 699-700 n.l (Colo. 2010). The Colorado Supreme Court
further observed, "[n]either consideration applies" when "the death penalty has been
abandoned by the prosecution and the defendant explicitly objected to counsel's actions on
his behalf." Id.
43. See supra Part I.A.2.
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ant in a way that other types of decisions are not and therefore
belong to the defendant alone." For example, the Third Circuit
noted that defendants retain the right to decide whether to plead
guilty or take an appeal precisely because these decisions relate
to the objective of the representation." And while decisions such
as waiving a jury trial or testifying may be viewed as strategic
decisions that are designed to achieve that objective, "these deci-
sions are so personal and crucial to the accused's fate that they
take on an importance equivalent to that of deciding the objec-
tives of the representation."46 However, other decisions-for ex-
ample, the decision to object to possible juror misconduct-relate
more directly to the means of achieving that objective and are
therefore viewed as decisions that belong to defense counsel.47
Second, in deciding whether a right belongs to the accused as
opposed to defense counsel, courts will look to the legal complexi-
ty of the decision involved.48 The more legally complex a decision
is, the more likely a court is to conclude that the decision must
belong to the defense counsel, even over the client's objection.49
The reason for this is fairly straightforward: giving the defendant
the right to make this decision would be useless because the de-
fendant is simply ill-equipped to exercise that right properly."
Third, lower courts appear particularly concerned that increas-
ing the number of decisions that fall within the exclusive control
of the defendant could significantly reduce trial efficiency." Put
44. See Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1435 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that
such decisions include the entering of a guilty plea, taking an appeal, waiving a jury trial,
and testifying).
45. Id. (holding that the decision to bring alleged juror misconduct to the attention of
the trial judge belonged to the attorney because it was not a "fundamental personal deci-
sion comparable to the decisions on whether to forgo assistance of counsel, to waive a jury
trial, or to testify in one's own behalf").
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See Van Alstine v. State, 426 S.E.2d 360, 363 (Ga. 1993) (holding that the decision
to submit lesser-included offense instructions is a strategic decision that belongs to de-
fense counsel because it "is often based on legal complexities only the most sophisticated
client could comprehend, not unlike the tactical decisions involved regarding the assertion
of technical defenses"); see also State v. Eckert, 553 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting that the decision to request lesser-included offense instructions belongs to the law-
yer because it "is a complicated one involving legal expertise and trial strategy").
49. See, e.g., Van Alstine, 426 S.E.2d at 363; Eckert, 553 N.W.2d at 544.
50. See, e.g., Van Alstine, 426 S.E.2d at 363; Eckert, 553 N.W.2d at 544.
51. See United States ex rel. Brown v. Warden, 417 F. Supp. 970, 973 (N.D. fI. 1976)
(holding that one factor to be considered in determining the scope of attorney/client control
relates to the "the practical necessities of the adversary system").
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simply, "[t]he adversary process could not function effectively if
every tactical decision required client approval."2 In this sense,
the trial judge is hardly in a position to "continually satisfy him-
self that the defendant was fully informed as to, and in complete
accord with, his attorney's every action or inaction that involved
any possible constitutional right."53
Lastly, courts may be inclined to restrict the decisions that be-
long exclusively to clients in order to avoid discouraging lawyers
from accepting appointed cases-something that may occur if de-
fense attorneys are not permitted to maintain control over the
conduct of the case.54 To that end, attorneys may be unwilling to
accept cases if clients could force them to make decisions that the
attorneys thought would cause them to lose cases and adversely
affect their professional reputations.55
This is not to say that lower courts are completely unwilling to
expand the number of decisions that are deemed fundamental
and therefore reserved to the defendant,5 6 or that lower courts are
52. United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 2010).
53. Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973).
54. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.6(b) ("In the end, this concern of the courts
that the lawyer not be forced to sacrifice his professional reputation while providing no
true assistance to his client may explain much of the law governing the division of author-
ity between counsel and client.").
55. Id.
56. Lower federal and state courts have held that, in addition to those rights deemed
fundamental by the United States Supreme Court, the defendant has a fundamental right
to decide the matters discussed below. First, whether to waive the right to attend im-
portant pre-trial hearings. See, e.g., Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1993)
(deposition); Don v. Nix, 886 F.2d 203, 206-07 (8th Cir. 1989) (deposition); Garcia v. State,
492 So. 2d 360, 363-64 (Fla. 1986) (pretrial conference on issues addressing both venue
and jury selection); State v. Johnson, 635 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(speedy trial hearing). Second, whether to waive the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 543 P.2d 619,624-25 (Cal. 1975) (dis-
tinguishing between constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights). In New York v. Hill,
which held that being tried within the 180-day time period specified in the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers was a tactical decision for the attorney to make, the Supreme
Court spoke generally about an attorney's traditional right to control "scheduling mat-
ters." See 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000); supra note 34 and accompanying text. In this regard,
Hill did not address the constitutional right to a speedy trial but dealt only with partial
relinquishment of certain statutory speedy trial rights. Third, whether to pursue an insan-
ity defense. See, e.g., People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1369-70 (Cal. 1975); Jacobs v. Com-
monwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412, 417-18 (Ky. 1994); Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1055 (Md.
1988); Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 1013, 1015 (Nev. 2001) (presenting an insanity de-
fense against defendant's wishes is a constitutional violation constituting per se reversible
error). The defendant's authority to reject the defense attorney's recommendation and in-
sist that an insanity defense not be raised is premised on the assumption that the defend-
ant has the competency to stand trial and make decisions for himself. See Godinez v. Mo-
ran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993).
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always in agreement regarding which decisions belong to the
lawyer and which belong to the accused.7 However, for many of
the reasons detailed above, in the words of one legal commenta-
tor, "courts are naturally reluctant to expand the number of mat-
ters over which a criminal defendant has control.""8
As a result, while certainly not the case with respect to every
possible decision,9 and while any given jurisdiction may depart
from the norm, in addition to the Supreme Court holdings refer-
enced above, lower federal and state courts appear to be in gen-
eral agreement that a broad range of decisions are deemed mat-
57. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.6(a) (summarizing numerous court deci-
sions relating to whether certain decisions were matters of strategy or concerned the fun-
damental rights of the accused and noting that, "[tiaken together, the various rulings pro-
duce a picture that is clear at many points but clouded at others'). The following examples
provide a sample of lower federal and state court rulings. First, whether to present a pos-
sible mitigating factor in the penalty phase of a capital case. Compare People v. Deere, 710
P.2d 925, 931-32 (Cal. 1985) (failure of defense counsel to present any mitigating evidence
at the penalty phase of a capital trial constitutes ineffective assistance even though coun-
sel acted in obedience to his client's request), with State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892, 959
(Utah 2012) (defendant's "Sixth Amendment right to 'control the course of the proceedings
carries with it the right to choose how much-if any-mitigating evidence is offered"); see
also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007) (holding that where a mitigating factor
cannot be supported without he defendant's cooperation, the defendant has an inherent
veto authority in his refusal to cooperate). Second, whether to stipulate to the introduction
of prior recorded testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that defense counsel in a criminal case may waive his client's Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of preliminary hearing
transcript); cf. Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 496 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that in the
context of admitting preliminary hearing testimony, the defendant's decision to waive the
right of confrontation must be effected personally by an accused who is acting intentional-
ly and knowledgeably). Third, whether, over the defendant's objections, defense counsel
has authority to concede guilt to a less serious crime as part of a trial strategy designed to
avoid conviction for a more serious crime. See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.
2002). This is an area in which substantial disagreement exists. See Kimberly Helene
Zelnick, In Gideon's Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of
Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 393 (2003) (explaining that "[e]very [federal]
circuit to consider the question has held that a concession strategy, even if employed over
the defendant's objections, is within counsel's purview"). However, this is not to say that
this issue is likewise foreclosed in state courts. See Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057
(Nev. 1994) (holding defense counsel could not concede his client's guilt to second degree
murder but argue the client was not guilty of the more serious first-degree murder
charge); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142,1147 (N.H. 1991) (indicating when defense counsel
admitted to a lesser-included offense over defendant's objection, the attorney "prevented
any meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case"). It is unclear how the Su-
preme Court's decision in Florida v. Nixon will impact this area of law, as the Court's de-
cision in Nixon may relate only to capital trials and circumstances in which the defendant
never expressly accepts nor rejects defense counsel's strategy. See 543 U.S. 175, 192
(2004).
58. Troccoli, supra note 29, at 34.
59. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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ters of trial strategy and belong to the attorney."0 These decisions
include: whether to request that the jury be charged on lesser-
included offenses,6' whether to request or consent to a mistrial,62
whether to seek a change of venue due to prejudicial pre-trial
publicity,3 whether to seek a competency determination,64 and
choosing among different theories of defense that could produce a
complete acquittal.65
60. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
61. The decision to request a lesser-included offense instruction is essentially a ques-
tion of gambling. In other words, "[t]actically, the choice is whether to 'go for broke,' that
is, have the jury vote up or down on the gravest charge, or to provide a possible locus of
compromise." H. Richard Uviller, Calling the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the
Accused and Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 748
(2000). However, it should be noted that, unlike the decision to concede guilt to a lesser
offense when defense counsel simply requests a lesser-included offense instruction, the
attorney may nonetheless argue for a complete acquittal. Compare Arko v. People, 183
P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2008) (noting that "a defendant retains all of his trial rights when he
requests that a jury consider a lesser offense instruction," including, "the opportunity to
advocate for outright acquittal"), with supra note 57 and accompanying text. The third
edition of the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice provides that the decision to request a
lesser-included offense instruction belongs to the attorney. See ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1993). And, "[slince issuance of
the 1993 ABA Commentary, courts have uniformly decided that whether or not to ask the
trial judge to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses is a matter of strategy and tac-
tics ceded by a defendant to his lawyer." People v. Colville, 979 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (N.Y.
2012).
62. See United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) ("Given the
many issues that must be identified, evaluated, and weighed when determining whether
to seek or accept a mistrial, we think it clear that the decision is a tactical one to be made
by counsel, not the client."); see also United States v. Washington, 198 F.3d 721, 723 (8th
Cir. 1999); Watkins v. Kassulke, 90 F.3d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1996); Virgin Islands v.
Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1434 (3d Cir. 1996); People v. Ferguson, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80
(N.Y. 1986).
63. See Muldrow v. State, 744 S.E.2d 413, 417-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that
the trial court properly accepted counsel's stipulation as to venue, even though this stipu-
lation was made in defendant's presence and the defendant was never asked if he agreed);
State v. Hereford, 592 N.W.2d 247, 252 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that venue is within
the sphere of tactical decision making reserved to defense counsel and therefore waiver
does not require defendant's personal participation); see also United States ex rel. Agron v.
Herold, 426 F.2d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that when the record shows appellant
waived the pretrial publicity claim, the court may deny him or her relief).
64. See Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 689 (2014) (obligating defense counsel to raise the issue of competency where indicia
of incompetence raises a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence to stand trial and
noting, "deference to the client's desire not to raise the issue of his competency does not
justify or excuse such a failure. It is well-settled that counsel is obligated to raise the issue
over the defendant's objections if reason exists to doubt the defendant's competency"); see
also Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564, 566 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) ("If defense
counsel suspects that the defendant is unable to consult with him with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding, he cannot blindly accept his client's demand that his com-
petency not be challenged.").
65. See United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) (positing
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B. Ethical Guidelines and Attorney-Client Control Over Decision
Making
While constitutional jurisprudence represents the minimum
amount of authority that the criminal defendant must be given
with respect to his or her right to make certain decisions, ethical
rules could provide the client with greater decision-making con-
trol than he or she is constitutionally entitled.6" As indicated be-
low, while current ethics rules do somewhat expand the number
of decisions that are reserved exclusively for the client, ethics
rules generally do not alter the dominant paradigm of expansive
attorney control over strategic and tactical decisions.
1. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The most important set of ethics rules that regulate attorney
conduct are the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Model Rules have been adopted, at least in part, as the formal
ethics rules by every state in the country, with the exception of
California.67
In terms of regulating attorney/client decision making, Model
Rule 1.2 establishes that the client defines the objectives of the
representation, while the lawyer is tasked with consulting the cli-
ent as to the means by which those objectives should be
achieved.68 In the context of a criminal matter, Model Rule 1.2
that defense counsel's right to select the theory of defense is derived from the Supreme
Court's decision in Henry v. Mississippi). For a discussion of Henry, see supra note 36. See
also United States v. Ladd, 215 F. App'x 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[A]s a general rule
choosing a defensive theory" is a decision "to be made by counsel, not the defendant."); Ar-
ko, 183 P.3d at 558 (quoting Steward v. People, 498 P.2d 933, 934 (1972)) ("Defense coun-
sel stands as captain of the ship in ascertaining what evidence should be offered and what
strategy should be employed in the defense of the case.").
66. See infra note 90.
67. 'The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in 1983 .... Before the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA model was the
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.... Preceding the Model Code was the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, http://www.am
ericanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model-rules-of-professional
conduct.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (providing a history of the evolution of ABA ethics
codes). The author does not wish to give the impression that attorneys practicing in the
State of California are doing so within some sort of ethical vacuum. In fact, attorney con-
duct in California is regulated by a separate ethics code called the California Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (CAL. BAR ASS'N 1992) http:
//rules.calbar.ca.gov/Rules/RulesofProfessionalConduct.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("[A] lawyer
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tracks closely to the decision-making paradigm established in
Jones and indicates that the client has authority to decide, "as to
a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify.' ' "9
Model Rule 1.2 appears to suggest that the "means" used to ac-
complish the defendant's objectives are the functional equivalent
of strategic and tactical decisions, and as such fall within the
province of the lawyer's decision-making authority." However,
while this objective-means test appears fairly easy to follow,
Model Rule 1.2 is somewhat less precise than it appears.
With regard to control over strategic and tactical decisions, the
official comment to Rule 1.2 provides that, while the client should
normally defer to the lawyer with respect to the means used to
accomplish the client's objectives, lawyers should normally "defer
to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be in-
curred and concern for third persons who might be adversely af-
fected."'" Importantly, the comment to Model Rule 1.2, without
further elaboration, provides that beyond those concerns, when
the lawyer and the client "disagree about the means to be used to
accomplish the client's objectives" because "of the varied nature of
the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and
because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a
tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such
disagreements are to be resolved.
7 2
As a result, current ethics rules provide little meaningful guid-
ance for defense counsel faced with the dilemma of whether to ig-
nore his or her client's demands regarding a wide array of trial
tactics or strategy. In light of this recognition, it is not surprising
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and ... shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
69. Id.; see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also Joy & McMunigal, su-
pra note 6, at 34.
70. See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 2, at 14 (commenting that Model Rule 1.2 appears
to suggest "[s]trategic and tactical decisions are only means and, as such, are squarely
within the lawyer's province").
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). Professor
Rodney Uphoff provides an example of when defense counsel may be ethically required to
defer to the client's wishes with respect to a tactical decision that would adversely affect a
third person. According to Uphoff, defense counsel may be required to respect a client's
decision not to call his elderly father as an exculpatory witness at trial because of the de-
fendant's concerns that the stress of testifying at trial would impact his elderly father's
health. See Uphoff, Tactical Choices, supra note 14, at 778.
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, r. 1.2, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
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to hear one legal commentator observe that the vagueness of the
objective-means test and the inconsistencies in the Model Rules
and its official comments leave the lawyer relatively free to decide
strategic and tactical questions as he or she sees fit, even in the
face of a client's objections.73 Therefore, while the Model Rules do
not expressly indicate which party should have final say with re-
spect to strategic and tactical decisions about which the lawyer
and client disagree, the Model Rules do little to restrict the attor-
ney who wishes to exercise ultimate attorney control over such
decisions."4
2. ABA Criminal Justice Standards-Defense Function
Additionally, in deciding whether to abide by a client's wishes,
defense attorneys may look to the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice-Defense Function. While the ABA's Standards for Crim-
inal Justice have no legal authority unless adopted by a court or
legislature, they nevertheless serve as among the most widely
cited set of guidelines detailing professional norms.7" The Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice also represent an influential source of
guidance in terms of defining the ethical limitations of attorney
conduct.76
Most relevant to the instant discussion, Standard 4-5.2 pro-
vides that in addition to those rights reserved exclusively to the
client pursuant to Jones, a competent client retains the sole right
to decide whether to be represented by counsel, to cooperate with
the government, and to speak at sentencing.7 However, beyond
those decisions, Standard 4-5.2(d) reads, "[s]trategic and tactical
decisions should be made by defense counsel, after consultation
with the client where feasible and appropriate."" In fact, the
73. "When decisions are truly tactical, however, the Model Rules... neither require
nor expressly encourage that the choices be made by the client. Thus, counsel has consid-
erable freedom in allocating decision-making authority when faced with tactical deci-
sions." Mitchell, supra note 15, at 257-58.
74. Id.
75. See Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for
the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011).
76. Cecelia Klingele, Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New ABA Criminal
Justice Standards (Don't) Say About the Duties of Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 983, 985 (2011).





comment to Rule 4-5.2 reads, "[t]he lawyer should seek to main-
tain a professional relationship at all stages while maintaining
the ultimate choice and responsibility for the strategic and tacti-
cal decisions in the case.""9 In this sense, while somewhat expand-
ing the number of decisions over which the client retains exclu-
sive control, the latest edition of the Criminal Justice Standards
continues to provide the attorney with broad authority to make
strategic and tactical choices.
II. How DIFFERENT LAWYERING PHILOSOPHIES ADDRESS THE
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT CONTROL OVER THE DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS
Cleary, decisional law at both the state and federal level, as
well as current ethical guidelines, generally provides the criminal
defense attorney with fairly expansive decision-making authority,
even in the face of his or her client's objection.
However, the mere fact that an attorney may have the legal
authority to make a given decision, even over his or her client's
objection, does not end the debate concerning the proper alloca-
tion of decision-making authority between the lawyer and the cli-
ent. For example, assume that defense counsel and the accused
disagree regarding a decision that, in a given jurisdiction, is con-
sidered a tactical decision the lawyer is privileged to make. Even
though the attorney may have the legal authority to make such a
decision over the client's objection, should defense counsel none-
theless yield to the client's wishes?
As noted earlier, legal scholars have attempted to answer this
question through the formulation of two primary models of law-
yering: s° the traditional lawyer-centered model which dictates
that defense counsel should make whatever decision he or she
79. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2 cmt. (3d
ed. 1993). The Fourth Edition is the most recent edition of the Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice-Defense Function. However, as of this writing, the Standards have been released
without comments. Therefore, the above quote is from the Third Edition of the Standards
for Criminal Justice-Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2. However, both the Third and
Fourth Editions of Standard 4-5.2 plainly indicate that defense counsel should make all
strategic and tactical decisions after consulting with the client, where feasible. It is unlike-
ly that the Fourth Edition of Standard 4-5.2 would therefore alter the validity of the above
quoted commentary in any meaningful way. See supra notes 8-11.
80. See ABA Defense Function Standard 4-5.2 comment (Third Edition); supra notes
8-11 and accompanying text.
20161 1109
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
deems best regardless of the client's demands,8 and the client-
centered model, which provides that the defendant should exer-
cise ultimate control over all decisions that are likely to have a
substantial egal or non-legal impact on the client's life. 2
A. The Lawyer-Centered Approach
The lawyer-centered approach is regarded as the traditional
approach to the lawyer-client relationship."3 Under this view, once
the client has agreed to be represented by trained counsel, "the
client essentially delegates to the lawyer primary responsibility
for problem solving and decision making."4 As a result, the cli-
ent's role in the representation becomes largely passive.8 The
lawyer-centered approach is premised on the notion that the law-
yer should exercise "broad autonomy and authoritarian control
over the professional relationship,"" because it is the lawyer, not
the client, who is the skilled professional with specialized legal
knowledge.87 Moreover, in addition to the lawyer's expertise, the
81. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also supra note 12 (noting a different
approach, beyond the lawyer and client-centered models, in answering the question of
whether it is the lawyer or the client who should have ultimate decision-making control).
Interestingly, data has emerged indicating that a majority of lawyers advocate for a law-
yer-centered, as opposed to client-centered, approach. See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 2, at
51. In a comprehensive study of almost 700 public defenders from five different jurisdic-
tions, Professors Rodney Uphoff and Peter Wood asked lawyers who should have the final
say on twelve different strategic decisions that frequently confront lawyers. Id. at 30-32.
The survey results indicated that, while somewhat dependent upon the particular public
defender office, the majority of respondents adopted a lawyer-centered approach to deci-
sion making, whereas a substantial minority advocated for a client-centered position. Id.
at 38, 57.
83. See Uphoff, Strategic Decisions, supra note 5, at 5 (describing the lawyer-centered
model as the traditional view of lawyering theory).
84. See HERMAN & CARY, supra note 11, at 8.
85. See id. at 10.
86. Id.
87. Uphoff, Tactical Choices, supra note 14, at 766. In terms of the lawyer-centered
model,
[t]he lawyer, as a trusted and skilled professional, utilizes her training and
specialized knowledge to manage the client's legal problem or case in accord-
ance with counsel's best judgment. Thus, except for a few fundamental deci-
sions specifically reserved for the defendant, the criminal defense lawyer
makes all tactical and strategic decisions.
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lawyer is in a better position to make decisions than the client be-
cause the lawyer is not as emotionally involved in the case."
As a result, with the exception of the "few fundamental deci-
sions" that are reserved for the client, "the criminal defense law-
yer [should] make all tactical and strategic decisions" that may
occur during the trial process."9 This is true even when defense
counsel and the client disagree over a question of strategy and
tactics.9°
Perhaps the most poignant summary of the arguments for a
lawyer-centered approach to decision making can be found in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Nelson v. California.9' In Nelson, de-
fense counsel refused to accede to the client's wishes regarding a
question of trial strategy (pursuing a motion to suppress physical
evidence).92 In advancing a lawyer-centered approach to decision
making the court wrote,
[d]oes the fact that here there was prior consultation with the ac-
cused, and that he disagreed with counsel's strategy, make a legal
difference? ... Our view is that the result should be the same. Our
reasons are that only counsel is competent to make such a decision,
that counsel must be the manager of the law-suit, that if such deci-
sions are to be made by the defendant, he is likely to do himself more
harm than good, and that a contrary rule would seriously impair the
constitutional guaranty of the right to counsel. One of the surest
ways for counsel to lose a law-suit is to permit his client to run the
trial.93
88. See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that with respect to the lawyer-
centered model, the lawyer makes all tactical and strategic decisions in part "because the
lawyer as a detached expert is in a better position to do so than is the untrained, emotion-
ally involved client").
89. See Uphoff, Tactical Choices, supra note 14, at 766. It should be pointed out that,
while the lawyer-centered model empowers the lawyer to make decisions on behalf of the
client, the lawyer must still comply with existing ethical rules, as indicated in Part I.B.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2013). As a result, the lawyer
must allow the client to make the decisions ethics rules deem within the exclusive prov-
ince of the client. Id. Further, while the attorney may have authority to make strategic
and tactical decisions, ethics rules may nevertheless impose an ethical duty upon defense
counsel to consult with his/her client regarding matters of trial tactics and strategy. See
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-5.2 (AM. BAR ASS'N
4th ed.); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90. $ee Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965) (summarizing the argu-
ment for the lawyer-centered approach to decision making).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 78-79.
93. Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
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Therefore, under the traditional lawyer-centered approach to
decision making, when the lawyer has the legal authority to make
a particular strategic decision, the lawyer does not yield to the
client's wishes. Instead, it is the lawyer who knows best, and, as a
result, the lawyer makes whatever decision he or she deems like-
ly to be the most effective.
B. The Client-Centered Approach
The client-centered approach to the attorney/client relationship
is regarded as "being at the opposite end of the theoretical spec-
trum from the lawyer-centered model."94 To that end, the lawyer-
centered approach has been heavily criticized for its paternalistic
focus and corresponding lack of attention to client dignity and au-
tonomy.95 However, unlike the traditional lawyer-centered model,
the client-centered approach stresses the importance of client au-
tonomy by expanding the decision-making authority given to the
client.9"
In this regard, the emergence of the client-centered model of
lawyering began in earnest with the growth of clinical legal edu-
cation in the 1960s and 1970s.97 Many of these early clinical law
professors came from civil legal services or public defender offic-
es.9" Based upon their experiences, they came to believe that too
many public interest lawyers forced "decisions upon their cli-
ents."99 Advocates of the client-centered model "emphasized the
need to promote increased client participation in the resolution of
their cases."'' ° Further, the growing clinical education movement
of the 1970s was in search of a particular pedagogy, and a lawyer-
ing model focused on the goal of increased client participation
resonated strongly with the values of these early clinical law pro-
fessors.0 1
94. See HERMAN & CARY, supra note 11, at 11.
95. See id. at 10 ('The lawyer-centered model has been widely criticized as being in-
consistent with client dignity and the intrinsic value of client self-determination.").
96. Uphoff, Tactical Choices, supra note 14, at 768-69 ('The client-centered model
seeks to promote client autonomy by making clients responsible for decisionmaking.").
97. See Zeidman, supra note 11, at 876-77.
98. See id. at 877.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 381, 383 (noting that the emergence of client-centered
lawyering "fell into the hands of an eager and growing audience of clinical law professors,
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Against this backdrop, the construct of client-centered lawyer-
ing emerged. The most widely used paradigm of client-centered
lawyering was first proposed by Professors David Binder and Su-
san Price in their groundbreaking 1977 work, Legal Interviewing
and Counseling,"°2 and in revised editions of the text now called
Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach."3 To that
end, "[a]lthough presented under the rubric of interviewing and
counseling, the client-centered approach offered something much
more momentous: an alternative vision of lawyering that concep-
tualized legal representation primarily in problem-solving terms
and redefined the boundaries of decision-making authority in the
lawyer-client relationship."'' 4
With the release of the third edition of Lawyers as Counselors,
more than thirty-five years since its introduction, the Binder/
Price model of client-centered lawyering "retains its center-stage
position in legal education.""1 5
Since 1977, when the model of client-centered representation
proposed by Binder and Price was first introduced, variants of
this model have emerged and new lawyering skill texts have in-
deed entered the field.0 6 As a result, Lawyers as Counselors is
who saw its value within the new curricula they were developing for use in live-client clin-
ics, and immediately put it to use").
102. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 11.
103. In 1991, Professors Binder and Price published a revised version of their original
text. They added Paul Bergman as a third author and changed the name of the text to
Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN
& SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991). In
2004, the second edition of Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach was pub-
lished, adding Paul R. Tremblay as a fourth author. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN,
SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL TREMBLAY, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). In 2012, a third edition of the book was released, with Ian S.
Weinstein replacing Susan Price. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 11. By the early 1990s, the
Binder/Price text enjoyed widespread use in American law schools. See Anthony V. Alfieri,
The Polities of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 7, 15 n.49 (1990) ("In 1989 and
1990, the West Publishing Co. estimated adoption of Binder and Price's Legal Interviewing
and Counseling by over 100 law schools and colleges in the United States."). Writing in
2006, Professor Katherine Kruse observed of the Binder/Price text, "[o]ver twenty-five
years and two editions later, the client-centered approach remains the predominant model
for teaching lawyering skills." Kruse, supra note 12, at 370.
104. Kruse, supra note 12, at 376.
105. See Amelia J. Uelmen, "Millennial Momentum" for Revising the Rhetoric of Law-
yers'Relationships and Roles, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 446, 462-63 (2011).
106. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 371. With the addition of these new lawyering texts,
as indicated in note 102, some legal educators and practitioners now prefer the collabora-
tive model of client counseling, or use of different decision-making models depending on
the particular issues involved in each decision.
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certainly not the only lawyering skills text in circulation. Howev-
er, the model of client-centered representation laid out in the
Binder/Price texts is frequently cited in other lawyering skills
textbooks as the model for client-centered counseling.°7 Further,
"[e]ven approaches that critique or depart from the client-
centered approach use it as the benchmark against which to
measure themselves.'' 8
Consequently, the model laid out by Binder and Price in Law-
yers as Counselors is "undoubtedly" the most influential model of
client-centered representation."9 For this reason, unless other-
wise noted, this article's description of client-centered lawyering
refers to the model created in Lawyers as Counselors, as this is
the most widely utilized paradigm of client-centered lawyering."°
This dominant model of client-centered representation assumes
that clients are quite capable and willing to participate in the de-
cision-making process. Assuming such, the role of the client-
centered lawyer is to: (1) help the client identify legal problems as
well as the non-legal aspects of the client's situation; (2) identify
the client's goals; (3) identify and evaluate options and likely al-
ternatives as a way of achieving the client's goals; (4) provide the
client with advice when requested; and (5) allow the client to
make all decisions that are likely to have a substantial egal or
non-legal impact on the client's life."'
107. See id. at 370-71; see, e.g., HERMAN & CARY, supra note 11, at 11; see also
COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAw 4-6 (3d ed. 2014); STEFAN H. KRIEGER &
RICHARD K. NEUMAN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 22 (5th ed. 2015).
108. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 370 n.5.
109. See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 2, at 8 n.25.
110. Zeidman, supra note 11, at 847 n.42. Moreover, I believe the above approach is
consistent with that of other legal scholars. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 36, at 503 n.113
(critiquing the theory of client-centered lawyering and its relationship to the client's role
in constructing case theory and stating, "I rely primarily on the model set out in Binder,
Bergman, and Price's Lawyers as Counselors as the most typical model and the one most
commonly used in legal education"); Paul R. Tremblay, Counseling Community Groups, 17
CLINICAL L. REV. 389, 397 (2010) ("For purposes of both respect and convenience, I will
refer to the default understanding of individual counseling as the 'Binder & Price' mod-
el."); Zeidman, supra note 11, at 847 n.42 ("By 'client-centered' counseling, I refer to the
model proposed originally in DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).").
111. See BINDER, ET AL., supra note 11, at 316-44 (exploring the role of the client-
centered lawyer through the use of hypotheticals).
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According to the proponents of client-centered representation,
clients are primary decision makers for reasons related to the im-
portance of protecting client dignity and autonomy.1 2 The theory
holds, "[c]lients should have primary decision-making power in
part because of the simple truth that problems are theirs, not
yours. After all, clients and not you have to live with decisions'
immediate and long term consequences."'113 Further, vesting cli-
ents with primary decision-making power increases the chances
of clients obtaining maximum satisfaction, as clients are presum-
ably better able to determine for themselves how a potential deci-
sion is most likely going to achieve this result."4
This is not to say, however, that client-centered representation
entails providing clients with the authority to make every deci-
sion that is part of the trial process."1 5 Indeed, client-centered ad-
vocates acknowledge this would prove unworkable for reasons re-
lated to time and common sense."6 Additionally, a client's
reasonable expectation in agreeing to be represented by counsel is
that the lawyer will make certain decisions that are related to the
lawyer's technical knowledge and skill, even without consulting
the client."'
In this regard, decisions that "involve primarily the exercise" of
a lawyer's "skills and crafts" fall within the purview of the attor-
ney's exclusive control."' As a result, only when a decision is
"likely to have an influence beyond that normally associated with
the exercise of lawyering skills and crafts" does the "substantial
impact standard" require that the lawyer consult with the client
regarding what decision to make"' and to correspondingly respect
the client's wishes.'2° Examples of decisions that are uniquely re-
112. Id. at 4 ("Underlying client-centeredness is the philosophy that clients are auton-
omous and therefore deserving of making important decisions that lead to resolution of
their legal problems and the achievement of their aims.").
113. Id. at 318.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 321.
116. Id. at 322 (observing that neither clients nor lawyers would find acceptable a situ-
ation where constant consultation regarding simple matters, such as whether to send doc-
uments by regular or overnight mail, was required).
117. Id. at 326.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 338 ("Being a lawyer does not provide you with a license to refuse to imple-
ment or even to try to talk clients out of all decisions with which you disagree. Indeed, cli-
ent-centeredness insists that clients have the privilege to make lousy decisions that 'give
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lated to lawyering skills include how to cross-examine a witness,
write briefs, or phrase a contingency clause."1
Obviously, it is not possible to create a complete list of every
decision that must be made during the trial process and to
preemptively determine whether a client-centered advocate
would consider that decision as one belonging to the lawyer or the
client. Nor will it always be easy to discern whether the impact of
a given decision is beyond that normally associated with the exer-
cise of lawyering skills and crafts.'22 Instead, the proponents of
client-centered representation view the "substantial impact"
standard as one that leaves room for the lawyer to exercise prac-
tical judgment when determining if a given decision belongs to
the lawyer or the client.
123
In light of this observation, assume that a lawyer uses his or
her practical judgment and determines that a given decision sat-
isfies the substantial impact standard and is therefore the client's
decision to make, but the lawyer believes the client is making an
ill-advised choice. When the lawyer finds himself or herself in this
predicament, what is the client-centered counselor supposed to
do? According to client-centered advocates, "[c]lient-centeredness
regards clients as moral agents whose decisions you [meaning the
lawyer] are normally bound to respect, even if you would have
made different ones.'
12 4
In fact, only when the lawyer feels as though the client has
made a decision that substantially contravenes the client's stated
objective, runs afoul of the lawyer's moral beliefs, fails to take
sufficient account of risk, or is contrary to the lawyer's profes-
sional standards, might the lawyer even "seek to have the clients
reconsider their decisions."''
If the client cannot be persuaded to reconsider his or her deci-
sion, the client-centered lawyer's options are severely limited. Ba-
sically, the client-centered advocate must implement the client's
up the store' if they so choose.").
121. Id. at 326.
122. See Miller, supra note 36, at 513-14. (positing that a potential drawback of the
Binder[Price model of client-centered counseling is that it provides 'little guidance on how
to distinguish the typical lawyering skill that calls for lawyer-dominated choices from the
kind of skill that requires participatory decisionmaking").
123. BINDER ETAL., supra note 11, at 324.
124. Id. at 338.




choice or attempt to withdraw from the representation, although
pursuing the withdrawal option is not mandated. 126
Further, withdrawing from the client's case may not always be
permitted under a jurisdiction's ethics rules. '27 And, in a criminal
case, the trial judge may not allow the lawyer to withdraw from
the representation based on a number of different factors, includ-
ing the timing of withdrawal, the age of the case, and the incon-
venience to the witnesses.'
2s
Consequently, if the lawyer decides against making a motion to
withdraw or withdrawal is otherwise not possible, other than a
limited number of exceptions that are addressed below, the law-
yer should not simply overrule the client and implement the deci-
sion he or she deems best.'29 In fact, at no point in their discussion
does the dominant Binder/Price model suggest overruling the cli-
ent's preference and becoming a lawyer-centered advocate, even if
the client will not reconsider his or her position or the lawyer
cannot withdraw.2 ° Instead, the lawyer should continue to adopt
a client-centered approach.' Put simply, according to the most
126. See id. at 442 ("Thus, unless you intend to withdraw as counsel, you may find
yourself implementing decisions that you disagree with."). See generally id. at 338-44,
538-41.
127. Id. at 344. The Model Rules provide that a lawyer may withdraw if "the client in-
sists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(4) (AM. BAR
AsS'N 2013). However, it may not always be possible to do so. For example, if the disa-
greement arises in the middle of the trial or otherwise too late in the representation to
provide for meaningful substitution, the trial judge may not allow the lawyer to withdraw.
In fact, the drafters of the rule seem to acknowledge such and provide that a lawyer can-
not withdraw if he or she is ordered to continue representation by the tribunal. Id. at
1.16(c).
128. Wilson v. State, 753 So. 2d 683, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Sanborn v.
Florida, 474 So. 2d 309, 314 (1985)) (listing typical factors that courts will consider when
an attorney makes a motion to withdraw from a criminal case).
129. See generally BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 338-39, 428-48, 538-41. The third
edition of Lawyers as Counselors provides a separate section on counseling clients in crim-
inal cases. The vast majority of that section addresses how to counsel clients with respect
to accepting plea bargains and spends little time addressing whether the lawyer or client
should have final say when a disagreement occurs regarding a matter of trial tactics and
strategy. To the limited extent that this section touches on this topic, its approach is con-
sistent with the rest of the Binder/Price model of client-centered lawyering in that lawyers
are never told to overrule a client's strategic preference when a disagreement occurs re-
garding matters of trial tactics and strategy. Instead, lawyers are only told that they
should withdraw from representation if such a disagreement effects the lawyer's ability to
represent the client, but that this option, if it is even possible, should be utilized rarely. Id.
at 538-41.
130. See generally id. at 338-44, 428-48, 538-41.
131. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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widely utilized model of client-centered representation, "unless
you intend to withdraw as counsel, you may find yourself imple-
menting decisions that you disagree with.'
32
When the client-centered advocate finds himself or herself in
such a predicament, although it may risk damaging his or her
rapport with the client, some lawyers might ask clients to
acknowledge in writing that their lawyer has "reviewed with
them the risks that the decisions would not achieve their desired
aims."'3 Moreover, Binder and Price identify a limited number of
exceptions to the rule that the client gets to make every im-
portant decision. In this sense, client-centered lawyers recognize
that the client's decision-making control may be constrained by
the bounds of the law generally,' and more specifically, the re-
quirement that a lawyer comply with ethical rules governing de-
cision making.3' An additional exception relates to instances in
which the client is a minor or suffers from a mental impair-
ment. 1
36
Indeed, as Professor Paul Temblay has noted with respect to
client-centered counseling, "[w]hile thoughtful critics have con-
tinued to refine its understandings, the central premise of client-
centeredness-that lawyers ought to respect the ultimate choices
of their clients, rather than seek to impose their own choices, on
questions of legal objectives as well as tactics-has become estab-
lished doctrine within the academy."'3 7
132. BINDER ETAL., supra note 11, at 442.
133. Id. at 431 n.28.
134. Robert J. Condlin, 'What's Love Got to Do with It?"--"It's Not Like They're Your
Friends for Christ's Sake". The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82
NEB. L. REV. 211, 228 (2003) (referencing the Binder/Price model of client-centered lawyer-
ing and observing that, "[w]hen 'clients seek to go beyond the bounds of what is legal or
just,' however, client-centered lawyers do not 'disregard fundamental legal concepts and
moral values"').
135. BINDER, ET AL., supra note 11, at 323 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
1.2, 1.4 (2010)) (positing that lawyers "need to be aware of and comply with ethical rules
governing decision-making").
136. Id. at 10 n.8 (noting that "if your client is a minor or suffers from some sort of
mental impairment, you may need to undertake more of the decision-making than when
such factors are not present").
137. Paul R. Tremblay, Critical Legal Ethics, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 140 n.36
(2007) (reviewing LAWYERS ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL
READER (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005)).
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Although the above lawyering philosophy has become "estab-
lished doctrine within the academy," there appears to be no dis-
cussion of whether the above approach is consistent with the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
3
8
This topic will be addressed below.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
Regardless of whether the attorney adopts the lawyer-centered
or the client-centered approach to attorney/client decision mak-
ing, the attorney's actions must comport with the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.'9
In the traditional lawyer-centered approach, whenever the
lawyer exercises his or her authority to make a given strategic
decision and does so over the client's objection, clients can com-
plain that the attorney exercised poor judgment and therefore
deprived him or her of effective assistance of counsel.40 Even
when the attorney adopts a client-centered approach and yields to
the defendant's demands, despite the attorney's belief that a deci-
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Once again, this article has focused on the Binder/Price
theory of client-centered representation, as this is the most widely accepted model of cli-
ent-centered lawyering. However, it is worth briefly noting that other client-centered ad-
vocates have espoused somewhat different views regarding the proper allocation of attor-
ney/client decision making. To that end, Professor Alex J. Hurder has called for
negotiation between lawyers and clients in making all decisions. See Alex J. Hurder, Nego-
tiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 71, 75 (1996). Professor Hurder does not address how his proposal may be limited
by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Id. Additionally, in
a 1979 article, Professor Mark Spiegel called for the development of an informed-consent
doctrine that would take account of the interests of the client, the lawyer, and the public
in determining which decisions belonged to which party. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41,
42-43 n.10 (1979). However, Professor Spiegel's theory regarding informed-consent and
attorney/client decision making is limited to civil cases because of what Spiegel describes
as constitutional considerations that are present in criminal, but not civil matters. Id. at
43 n.10. However, Professor Spiegel never specifically addresses the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel or elaborates on what he means by constitu-
tional considerations. Id. at 139.
139. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970)) (holding that "the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel").
140. See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 694 (Colo. 2010) (citation omitted) (observ-
ing that one of the "limitations on an attorney's actions is that these decisions of trial
strategy are held to a standard of professional reasonableness. Without some ability to
review an attorney's allegedly unreasonable decisions, the right to counsel would be a hol-
low promise.").
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sion is unwise, defendants nevertheless complain that the attor-
ney provided ineffective representation by respecting their
choice.4'
A. The Sixth Amendment's Guarantee of Effective Assistance of
Counsel
1. The Strickland Test
The United States Supreme Court's seminal 1984 decision in
Strickland v. Washington created the current legal framework
under which ineffective assistance of counsel claims are ana-
lyzed.142 The Strickland Court articulated what has been referred
to as both the "well-worn"'43 and now "famous"'44 two-prong test
used by courts when reviewing Sixth Amendment claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.4
At its most basic, the test formulated in Strickland requires: (1)
attorney error (referred to as the performance prong) and (2)
prejudice (referred to as the prejudice prong) flowing from that
error.' Although more than thirty years have passed since
141. See Glenn E. Bradford, Whw's Running the Show? Decision-Making in the Court-
room in Civil and Criminal Cases, 62 J. Mo. B. 148, 156 (2006) (observing "[i]ronically,
criminal defendants have been known to allege ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel's acquiescing to the defendant's own wishes as to matters of trial tactics or strate-
gy"). It should be noted that this article addresses the defense attorney's obligation to pro-
vide effective assistance of counsel in instances in which the lawyer exercises final deci-
sion-making authority. When it is the defendant who has the authority to make the
ultimate decision, defense counsel's obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel is
limited to providing competent advice regarding that decision. See In Re Trombly, 627
A.2d 855, 857 (Vt. 1993) (holding that when the defendant had final authority over the
decision to request lesser-included offenses be presented to the jury, "[i]t follows that relief
should not be available... unless defense counsel improperly advised defendant or under-
took substandard practices at trial").
142. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Serious-
ly, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009) ('The governing standard for constitutional claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel comes from Strickland v. Washington."). The right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel applies to both court-appointed and privately retained attor-
neys. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685
("An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether etained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.").
143. Seaton v. United States, No. C-08-0105 MHP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56130, at *4
(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2010).
144. Christopher Seeds, Strategery's Refuge, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 987, 994
(2009).
145. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
146. Id.; see also Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Re-
reading Cronic and Strickland in Light of Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV.
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Strickland's holding, it still remains governing law today.'47 In-
deed, the Supreme Court made clear in its 2000 declaration in
Williams v. Taylor that the two-prong Strickland test "provides
sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.'48
a. The Performance Prong
The first prong of the test articulated in Strickland is the per-
formance prong.'9 The performance prong is the primary focus of
this article's ensuing discussion concerning ineffective assistance
of counsel and attorney/client decision-making control. For a
criminal defendant to prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel, the performance prong requires
the defendant to show that "counsel's performance was defi-
cient... [with] errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment."'5 Counsel's performance will be deemed constitutionally
deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness."'5' The Strickland Court further provided that in order to
determine whether counsel's conduct fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, reviewing courts should look to
whether the attorney's performance was reasonable under pre-
vailing professional norms at the time of representation.2
The Supreme Court noted, however, that "[p]revailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and
the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but
they are only guides."'53 In this regard, the appropriate focus in
229, 233-34 (2012) (referring to the first prong of the Strickland test as the "performance
prong" and the second prong as the "prejudice prong").
147. See Smith, supra note 142, at 518. Strickland itself involved a capital sentencing
proceeding. 466 U.S. at 686-87. However, the Supreme Court stated that such proceedings
are "sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for
decision, that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial." Id.
(citations omitted). This passage made clear that both prongs of the Strickland test were
to be employed not just during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding, but during
the trial phase as well. Id.
148. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000).
149. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Myers, supra note 146, at 233-34 (referring to
the first prong of Strickland).
150. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 689.
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evaluating a Sixth Amendment claim is whether defense counsel
has fulfilled his or her expected role in the adversarial process."'
As defined by the Strickland Court, the test of whether defense
counsel's performance was objectively reasonable is whether de-
fense counsel fulfilled his or her "overarching duty" to "bring to
bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process.""' Or, as expressed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, "[t]he overarching test for effective assistance of counsel is
whether the defendant's attorney subjected the prosecution's case
to meaningful adversarial testing."'56
In determining whether the lawyer's performance met this par-
ticular goal, the Court noted that there are countless ways to de-
fend the same case and that even the best criminal defense attor-
neys would not defend the same case in the same way. '
Therefore, in evaluating defense counsel's performance, "a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action, 'might be considered sound
trial strategy.""'"
b. The Prejudice Prong
In order to satisfy the Strickland test, however, the defendant
must also satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong."9 Strickland's
154. See id. at 687-91 (outlining expectations and evaluations of defense counsel); see
also People v. Watson, 965 N.E.2d 474, 481 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) ('The appropriate focus in
evaluating a sixth amendment claim is the adversarial process.").
155. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.10(b) ('The ul-
timate point of reference is that performance by counsel needed, under the circumstances
of the case, to ensure 'the proper functioning of the adversarial process.' It is this function
of counsel that provides the 'objective standard of reasonableness' and determines what is
'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."') (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-88).
156. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 686). The Strickland requirement of adversarial testing is most applicable when the
defendant proceeds to trial. Following Strickland, the Supreme Court has extended de-
fense counsel's duty under the performance prong to include the duty to inform the de-
fendant of a plea offer and to provide correct advice when the defendant is entering a
guilty plea or rejecting a guilty plea and deciding to proceed to trial. See Missouri v. Frye,
132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Hill v. Lock-
hart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985).
157. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
158. Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
159. Id. at 687. The Strickland Court held that "a court need not determine whether
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prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate "a reasona-
ble probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors [i.e.,
in violating the performance prong], the result of the proceeding
would have been different.""'6 "A reasonable probability is a prob-
ability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."6'
IV. CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
A. How Courts Have Analyzed Claims That Client-Centered
Defense Counsel Was Ineffective by Deferring to the Client's
Wishes
As noted above, defendants have in fact claimed they were de-
nied effective assistance of counsel precisely because an attorney
engaged in client-centered representation by deferring to the cli-
ent's wishes regarding a particular decision over which the par-
ties disagreed.162
counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the de-
fendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Id. at 697. Thus, courts may dispose of
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by resolving the prejudice prong, thereby avoid-
ing an evaluation of defense counsel's performance. See also United States ex rel. Cross v.
DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1987) (proceeding directly to prejudice prong
since performance issue requires "a particularly subtle assessment").
160. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
161. Id. Strickland's "reasonable probability" language requires demonstrating some-
thing more than "some conceivable effect" yet less than a "more likely than not" effect on
outcome. See id. at 693. As indicated above, a successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim generally requires the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice, i.e., a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the trial would have
been different. There is an exception, however, where counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, where there is the complete denial of
counsel during a critical stage of the prosecution, or circumstances surrounding the trial
make it impossible for even competent counsel to provide effective representation. See
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984). In such instances, prejudice is pre-
sumed. Id. at 660. But the Cronic exception is exceedingly narrow, and applies where the
defendant has demonstrated that "the attorney's failure [was] complete." Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685, 697 (2002); see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004). In other words, "the
circumstances leading to counsel's ineffectiveness [must be] so egregious that the defend-
ant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all." United States v. Griffin, 324
F.3d 330, 364 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Therefore, in order to successfully invoke
the Cronic exception to the requirement of having to prove prejudice, it may be necessary
for the defendant to show that counsel failed "entirely" to oppose the prosecution as op-
posed to showing simply that counsel failed to oppose the prosecution "at specific points"
in the proceeding. Bell, 535 U.S. at 697.
162. See supra note 142.
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However, courts have tended to reject such claims, finding that
although the attorney deferred to the client regarding a decision
over which the attorney had ultimate control, the defendant was
not denied effective assistance of counsel.'63
In analyzing such claims, with rare exception (an example of
which is a case decided by the Court of Appeals for Ohio,'64 which
will be discussed below), the majority of courts have adopted the
same analytical approach. In this regard, most courts have found
that once the lawyer has decided to acquiesce to the defendant's
demands regarding a strategic decision, the defendant is estopped
from bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
a version of the invited error doctrine."' In the words of one court,
163. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 2, at 24 ("State judges, like their federal counterparts,
have been quite willing to find that a lawyer has rendered constitutionally adequate and
effective representation even though counsel permitted her client to make a strategic deci-
sion typically made by counsel. A defendant whose lawyer follows his instructions regard-
ing a strategic trial decision rarely will be able to complain successfully on appeal that the
lawyer acted unprofessionally in abiding by the client's wishes.").
164. See generally State v. Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that courts must evaluate if lawyer's decision to follow client's wishes was itself ineffective
counsel). Another example of a decision which departs from the standard approach to re-
solving claims of ineffectiveness based on defense counsel's acquiescence to a client's stra-
tegic demands, and adopts the same approach as Rubenstein, can be found in State v. Lee,
which is discussed in greater detail in note 165. 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984); see infra note
165.
165. "The invited-error doctrine operates .. to estop a defendant from claiming inef-
fective assistance of counsel based on counsel's acts or omissions in conformance with the
defendant's own requests." People v. Majors, 956 P.2d 1137, 1153 (Cal. 1998) (quoting
People v. Long, 782 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1989)) (noting that this is held such in the context of
the defense attorney's failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction at the client's
insistence); see also Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
defense counsel was not ineffective for pursuing a trial theory that was demanded by the
defendant, despite counsel's desire to pursue alternative defense theories and that
"[p]etitioner, who preempted his attorney's strategy choice, cannot now claim as erroneous
the very defense he demanded [his lawyer] present"); Adkins v. State, 930 So. 2d 524, 539-
40 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant was estopped from claiming ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence
during the penalty phase of a capital trial when the defendant chose to waive the presen-
tation of that evidence); People v. Galan, 261 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(finding defendant could not complain he was denied effective assistance of counsel be-
cause the defense attorney yielded to the defendant's demand to call a witness despite
counsel's advice). This is not to say that no court has ever held that defense counsel's ac-
ceding to the client's wishes regarding a strategic decision constitutes ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. See State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1984). In State v. Lee, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that because defense counsel succumbed to his client's demand to call
two witnesses, whom defense counsel believed would present inconsistent and perjurious
testimony that would be harmful to his client's defense, counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance of counsel because he did not fulfill his duty to make tactical and strategic decisions.
Id. The court found defense counsel's conduct fell below the minimal level of competence
demanded of an attorney under Strickland's performance prong. Id. at 156-59. It should
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"when a defendant insists on a course of action despite his coun-
sel's contrary warning and advice, he may not later complain that
his counsel provided ineffective assistance by complying with his
wishes."'66 Said another way, if the lawyer and the defendant dis-
agree regarding a strategic decision, and the defendant demands
that the lawyer follow a given course of action despite being told
that doing so would increase the chances of the defendant's being
found guilty, "[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, a defendant
cannot by his own voluntary conduct invite error and then seek to
profit thereby."'67 As a result, courts have held that the defendant
is estopped from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.'68
As one legal commentator has observed, perhaps courts have
reached for the estoppel doctrine because "there is a sort of intui-
tive appeal to the idea that a client who unequivocally expresses
his wishes cannot later complain that representation consistent
be noted that the issue most squarely addressed in this article concerns claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel when the lawyer has the ultimate authority over important stra-
tegic decisions, but nevertheless urrenders that authority to the defendant-as the client-
centered lawyering model largely demands attorneys do. In this regard, other courts have
found that the attorney has not provided ineffective assistance of counsel when the lawyer
accedes to the client's demands. However, unlike the issue addressed in this article, those
decisions are premised on the notion that it was the defendant who maintained ultimate
decision-making control, not the attorney. In such a predicament, as explained in note
142, defense counsel cannot be found ineffective for allowing the defendant to make a deci-
sion upon which the defendant had ultimate authority. See supra note 142 (citing In re
Trombly, 627 A.2d 855, 856 (Vt. 1993)) (noting that when it is the defendant who has the
authority to make the ultimate decision, defense counsel's obligation to provide effective
assistance of counsel is limited to providing competent advice regarding that decision). For
that reason, while those cases may be worth noting, their exact rationale is not entirely
relevant to the precise issue addressed in this article. See, e.g., Trombly, 627 A.2d at 856-
57 (holding that defense counsel was not ineffective by yielding to the defendant's request
not to seek a lesser-included offense instruction; Trombly was based on an older version of
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice in which the decision to request a lesser-included
offense instruction belonged to the defendant); cf. People v. Colville, 979 N.E.2d 1125,
1130 (N.Y. 2012) (indicating that since the introduction of the more recent ABA Stand-
ards, courts have universally held this is a matter of trial strategy that belongs to the law-
yer); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991) (holding that as a matter of state law,
because of the "principal-agent nature of the attorney/client relationship" when the attor-
ney and the client reach an impasse regarding the decision to strike certain jurors, the cli-
ent's wishes must control, notwithstanding the tactical nature of the decision); Zagorski v.
State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that defense counsel was ethically bound
to follow the defendant's request not to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing
phase of a capital case).
166. Galan, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (quoting People v. Frierson, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 82
(1985)).
167. Adkins, 930 So. 2d at 539-40 (quoting Phillips v. State, 527 So. 2d 154, 156 (Ala.
1988).
168. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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with his wishes amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel."'69
Regardless of the intuitive appeal of such an argument however,
it is worth pointing out once again the Supreme Court's 2000
statement hat the two-prong "Strickland test provides sufficient
guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims.'70
Therefore, rather than simply concluding that a defendant is
estopped from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
when defense counsel accedes to the client's wishes, courts should
attempt to answer this question by actually employing Strick-
land's analytical framework.
In this sense, when faced with the question of whether acquies-
cence to a client's strategic preferences constituted ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in State v. Ru-
benstein did not conclude the defendant was estopped from
bringing such a claim. Instead, the court in looking to Strickland
correctly determined that in evaluating such a claim (like all inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims), "[fjirst there must be a de-
termination as to whether there has been a substantial violation
of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client.'
7'1
Otherwise stated, rather than applying the estoppel doctrine,
courts should ask whether defense counsel's initial acquiescence
to the client's strategic decision was consistent with counsel's "du-
ty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the
trial a reliable adversarial testing process.'72 Simply put, was it
ineffective assistance of counsel to accede to the client's wishes in
the first place?
7 3
While Strickland's test of reasonableness i intended to be ob-
jective, Strickland nevertheless requires that counsel's conduct be
169. Marceau, supra note 15, at 196.
170. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000).
171. See State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 156-59 (Ariz. 1984). For another example of a
court applying the same analytical approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on defense counsel's acquiesce to a client's strategic preferences, see supra note 166.
172. State v. Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732, 739 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (referencing Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
173. See Marceau, supra note 15, at 184 (noting that in addition to a lawyer's chosen
strategy, "a client's express request can conflict with the prevailing professional norms,
and, therefore, both must be reviewed by appellate courts to determine whether certain
minimum constitutional requirements have been satisfied").
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evaluated considering all the circumstances in the given case."'
The test almost always necessitates a "context-dependent, case-
by-case examination of the evidence."'7
In light of this recognition, there are an infinite number of sce-
narios that could come into play when evaluating whether the de-
cision to accede to the client's wishes was objectively reasonable.
This article cannot possibly endeavor to articulate all of them
with an eye toward determining whether defense counsel's con-
duct is objectively reasonable in each circumstance.
Nevertheless, as the below examples demonstrate, if courts
were to apply the proper analysis dictated by Strickland, they
would reach the conclusion that the lawyer who accedes to the
client's wishes, in many cases, does provide effective assistance of
counsel in accordance with Strickland's performance prong. How-
ever, in some cases, counsel does not meet the performance
standard.
B. Client-Centered Decision Making and Strickland's
Performance Prong
1. When Deference Satisfies Strickland's Performance Prong
As noted previously, with respect to determining whether de-
fense counsel's performance was objectively reasonable, reviewing
courts will presume that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."'76
In this sense, the attorney and the client may disagree about a
particular strategic decision. However, the mere fact that the cli-
ent wishes to adopt a particular strategic approach with which
the attorney disapproves does not by itself mean the client's pre-
ferred choice is objectively unreasonable. For example, in some
instances, had defense counsel made the same decision that the
client preferred, the given strategic decision may very well have
fallen within the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
174. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
175. McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral'" The Seismic Evolution of Padilla
v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 820
(2011).
176. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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tance.177 Further, as courts have observed, "[t]he range, it must be
said, is quite wide."'78
Take for example the previously mentioned case of State v. Ru-
benstein."' In Rubenstein, the defendant was charged with two
counts of assault arising out of a stabbing incident.8 ' One of the
victims failed to appear at the trial.' The defendant instructed
his attorney not to cross-examine witnesses, to forgo opening
statements, and to stipulate to a psychiatric report.'82 The attor-
ney complied with these requests.
183
While the court acknowledged that the ultimate decision re-
garding these matters belonged to the lawyer, the court neverthe-
less found that even though defense counsel acceded to the cli-
ent's wishes, the lawyer provided effective assistance of counsel.' 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the defense
strategy that counsel pursued at the insistence of the defendant
appeared to be one in which the attorney would argue that the
state could not prove its case without the testimony of the victim
and "consequently the defense would not risk opening the door to
an undesirable matter."'8
Certainly, there may have been better trial strategy available
to the defense, but the Court of Appeals for Ohio nevertheless
found this trial strategy reasonable based on the facts of the
case.' Presumably, if the defense attorney had adopted this ap-
proach on his own without the insistence of his client, it would
have likewise been considered objectively reasonable under
Strickland's performance prong.'7 Therefore, implementing the
177. Indeed, legal commentators have observed, 'There are times when the client is as
good a legal strategist as the lawyer." Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The
Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R. C.L. L. REV. 1,
28 (1993).
178. Bell v. United States, No. PJM 13-1682, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171705, at *9 (D.
Md. Dec. 8, 2014), dismissed, 599 F. App'x 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
179. 531 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
180. Id. at 734.
181. Id. at 735 n.2.





187. Additionally, in some instances, counsel's accession to the defendant's wishes may
itself be characterized as a strategic decision if doing so is necessary to ensure there is not
a breakdown of lawyer-client communication. In such circumstances, accession to the cli-
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client's strategic preferences did not cause the defense attorney to
forsake the type of meaningful adversarial testing envisioned by
the Sixth Amendment.
2. When Deference Violates Strickland's Performance Prong
Not every strategic decision that is favored by the defendant
will necessarily fall within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance. To that end, it is worthwhile to recall the di-
lemma I faced in the introduction of this article-whether to fol-
low my client's demands that I call a potential witness.18s While
my client insisted that I call this witness, I believed that doing so
would have resulted in introducing of evidence that would have
inculpated my client in the commission of the crime, without
helping his case.
The witness's testimony that she had been with my client at a
bar in the area of the robbery and that my client had left the bar
fifteen minutes before the robbery took place not only would have
placed my client in the area of the crime, but her testimony also
would have helped the prosecution prove that my client was actu-
ally in a position to commit the crime in question. Further, this
was evidence that the prosecution would have not otherwise
ent's wishes is consistent with prevailing professional norms. See, e.g., Hance v. Zant, 981
F.2d 1180, 1183 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that counsel complied with defendant's instruc-
tion not to contact his family members because counsel feared he would otherwise lose de-
fendant's cooperation). In the same vein, a lawyer may defer to the client's demands in
order to prevent the client from completely waiving the right to counsel and proceeding
pro se. See Adkins v. State, 930 So. 2d 524, 540 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001). Presumably, while
any given decision may be strategically unreasonable, yielding to the client's demands in
such instances may preserve the general integrity of the adversarial testing process. Of
course, this particular inquiry would be fact specific, and not every time the lawyer over-
rules the client's strategic preference is such a breakdown in lawyer-client communication
likely to occur or is the client likely to waive his right to counsel. See Virgin Islands v.
Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1437 (3d Cir. 1996) ("In many trial situations, the nature or
importance of the issue over which a client-counsel disagreement occurs cannot be ex-
pected to cause the client seriously to consider foregoing the advantages of the current
representation."). Further, if the law is unclear in terms of whether it is the lawyer or the
client who has ultimate decision-making authority, the lawyer may defer to the client's
wishes. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.6(a). Lastly, the lawyer is ethically required to
defer to the client's wishes regarding decisions that implicate third persons that might be
adversely affected. See supra Part I.B.1. And, in Nix v. Whiteside, a majority of the Su-
preme Court suggested that "action taken by an attorney to prevent a breach of profes-
sional responsibility necessarily meets Strickland's performance standard." See LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 16, § 11.10(b) (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986)).
188. See supra Introduction.
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known about, and this evidence would have actively undermined
what I believed was a viable misidentification defense.
If I had called this witness, at the client's insistence, I believe
my decision would have constituted ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Indeed, prevailing professional norms are violated when de-
fense counsel introduces non-cumulative evidence of the defend-
ant's guilt without a sufficient strategic justification."'
To that end, had I called the witness, I could not justify the de-
cision as one of trial strategy. As courts have observed in the con-
text of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "the presump-
tion that the challenged action or inaction was the product of
sound trial strategy may be overcome where no reasonably effec-
tive defense attorney, confronted with the circumstances of the
defendant's trial, would engage in similar conduct."' 90 Based on
the facts of my client's case, in particular, the availability of a
sound misidentification defense, the inculpatory nature of the
witness's testimony, the fact that the witness's testimony had lit-
tle or no exculpatory quality, and the fact that the prosecution
would not have otherwise had access to this information, no rea-
sonably effective attorney would have called the witness in this
scenario. Therefore, calling this proposed witness would have
fallen outside of the wide range of reasonably acceptable perfor-
191
mance.
As a result, had I surrendered ultimate decision-making con-
trol and allowed my client to have the final say on this issue (be-
lieving it to be a matter that was likely to have a substantial egal
impact), I would have knowingly implemented a decision that fell
below the minimal level of competence demanded of attorneys
under Strickland's performance prong.
In fact, by finding that defense counsel was not ineffective in
overruling a client's wishes regarding questions of strategy, nu-
merous courts have noted, "counsel's decision not to abide by the
189. See Justin F. Marceau, Remedying Pretrial Ineffective Assistance, 45 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 277, 278 (2012) (positing that a defense lawyer has provided ineffective assistance of
counsel when he or she provides representation that results in the discovery of additional,
non-cumulative evidence of the defendant's guilt); see also United States ex rel. Washing-
ton v. Acevedo, 630 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that defense counsel did
not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by refusing to present evidence that would
otherwise have inculpated the defendant in the commission of the crime).
190. People v. Watson, 965 N.E.2d 474, 481 (III. App. Ct. 2012).
191. See supra notes 189-90.
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wishes of his client has no necessary bearing on the question of
professional competence; indeed, in some instances, listening to
the client rather than to the dictates of professional judgment
may itself constitute incompetence.
3. The Constitutional Implications of Deference to the Client's
Strategic Choices
It is essential to note once again that the Strickland Court held
that defense counsel has a "duty to bring to bear such skill and
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing
process."'193 Consequently, if the client insists that defense counsel
violates that duty by implementing a decision that falls outside of
the range of reasonably competent representation that is required
of defense attorneys, the client-centered lawyer must implore the
client to reconsider the particular question of trial strategy or tac-
tics at hand. If the client will not, however, the constitutionally
mandated duty to provide the defendant with effective assistance
192. United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); see
also Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1435; Bell v. Georgia, 554 F.2d 1360, 1361 (5th Cir. 1977);
Bell v. United States, No. PJM 13-1682, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171705, at *11 n.4 (D. Md.
Dec. 8, 2014). It is worth pointing out the possibility that acceding to the client's wishes
when doing so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel may also represent a violation
of a defense attorney's ethical obligation of diligent advocacy. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). However, this is not always the case and such a de-
termination is necessarily fact specific. See In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. 1993) (de-
clining "to adopt a per se rule that successful post-conviction relief based on ineffective as-
sistance of counsel automatically results in an ethical violation, or, conversely, that a
denial of post-conviction relief will always insulate an attorney from professional disci-
pline. This rule apparently represents the uniform rule followed by other courts."). Addi-
tionally, even if the lawyer is found to be ineffective in acceding to a client's wishes, it is
unlikely that a lawyer would have engaged in malpractice. This is because,
the default rule appears to bar malpractice actions even where the defendant
can demonstrate that but for the errors of counsel there is a reasonable prob-
ability that the defendant would have been acquitted, which would suffice for
Sixth Amendment relief. Instead, the malpractice standard requires not just
proof of a likely different outcome at trial, but a showing by the defendant
that he is actually and not merely legally innocent.
Marceau, supra note 15, at 302. In this sense, the malpractice standard "is many degrees
more difficult to satisfy than the Strickland test." Id. at 303. As a result, the criminal de-
fense attorney who is faced with the dilemma of whether or not to acquiesce to the client's
strategic demands will primarily be concerned with satisfying the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as opposed to thinking about how his or her
decision to yield to a client's wishes will impact malpractice related liability.
193. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); see also In re Yung-Cheng
Tsai, 351 P.3d 138, 142 (Wash. 2015) (citing Strickland and noting that, pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment, "a criminal defense attorney has the constitutional duty to provide as-
sistance that is effective").
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of counsel in such a situation may actually require the attorney to
adopt a lawyer-centered model of decision making and overrule
the client's decision.
To that end, one legal scholar has opined that when the client
insists on making an unwise strategic decision, the lawyer should
do everything in his or her power to convince the client to make a
different decision.'94 However, if the client will not, the lawyer
can, "honor the client's preference unless acquiescence in the cli-
ent's decision would amount to ineffective assistance under the
Strickland standard, as it would, for example, if the client's pre-
ferred course of action were so unwise that no reasonable lawyer
would ever have chosen it in the absence of client insistence.'' 5
It may be suggested that the above examples and conclusion
are all premised on the idea that the client's goal is to win the
case. Accordingly, it should certainly be noted that while most de-
fendants are primarily concerned with obtaining an acquittal or a
lower sentence, this is not always true. A defendant's primary ob-
jective in electing to proceed to trial may be to shed light on what
the defendant views as police misconduct despite his or her guilt,
to express social or political frustrations, or even to prove that the
defendant, while admittedly very guilty, was not an FBI inform-
ant.'
96
Regardless, Strickland in no way indicates that defense coun-
sel's duty to bring about reliable adversarial testing of the prose-
194. Mitchell, supra note 15, at 259 n.25.
195. Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 157-58 (Ariz. 1984); dis-
cussion supra note 166.
196. A recent high-profile example of this was seen in the trial of Whitey Bulger, the
notorious Boston crime boss. It was alleged that Bulger had for many years been an FBI
informant while running a crime syndicate predicated on murdering his enemies. He went
to trial at the age of eighty-three on charges of racketeering, money laundering, extortion,
firearms possession, drug distribution, and murder. At trial, Bulger basically conceded
that he was guilty of most of the crimes with which he was charged. His defense seemed to
largely focus on proving that he was not an informant for the FBI. As one courtroom ob-
server commented,
[h]owever far-fetched, Bulger's informant denial is hardly new; at trial, it was
the overriding theme of his defense. He fully admitted to being a callous
crime boss who pocketed millions off illegal drugs and gambling, but he
wanted the world to know he was definitely no rat (and that he would never
kill a woman, even though he was charged with two counts of doing just
that). For Bulger, his high-profile trial-"the Big Show" as he dubbed it-
offered one last opportunity to rewrite the record, facts be damned.
Michael Friscolanti, Notorious Gangster James 'Whitey' Bulger Tells His Story, MACLEAN'S




cution's case is somehow triggered only when the defendant indi-
cates that his or her specific goal is to win the case. In fact, the
Strickland Court broadly held that, "[tlhe benchmark for judging
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just re-
sult.
197
Certainly, if the client wants to exercise final decision-making
authority over tactical decisions as well as pursue his or her
goals, the client can always waive the right to counsel and repre-
sent himself or herself.'s But, when the client elects to be repre-
sented by counsel and to proceed to trial, the client has chosen to
be represented by a lawyer who owes the client a constitutionally
mandated duty of effective assistance of counsel as defined by the
Strickland Court.199
It should be noted that the client-centered counselor may sub-
scribe to a more holistic or even consumer-oriented view of the
lawyer's role than the client is entitled to under the Sixth
Amendment."' The client-centered lawyer focuses on providing
the client with maximum satisfaction."' However, the Sixth
Amendment does not appear to recognize the right to counsel for
that purpose. Rather, "[t]he fundamental purpose of counsel un-
der the Sixth Amendment is to make sure that the Government's
evidence undergoes the testing provided by the adversarial sys-
tem.202
197. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added); see Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283,
1290 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing this particular passage from Strickland and positing that it
stands for the fact that "[tihe overarching test for effective assistance of counsel is whether
the defendant's attorney subjected the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial test-
ing").
198. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 808 (1975); supra note 19.
199. See also In re Yung-Cheng Tsai, 351 P.3d 138, 142-43 (2015) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686, 688) (holding that "a criminal defense attorney has the constitutional du-
ty to provide assistance that is effective [including the] duty to bring to bear such skill and
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process").
200. See L. Timothy Perrin, The Perplexing Problem of Client Perjury, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1707, 1720 (2007) (observing that "the widely embraced client-centered approach to
lawyering contributes to a consumeristic mentality on the part of lawyers. An advocate's
decisions during the client representation focus on providing the client with 'maximum
satisfaction."'); see also BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 318.
201. Id.
202. Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872, 905 (N.D. Ala. 1994), affd sub nom, Wal-
drop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1996).
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In light of this observation, the constitutional right to an attor-
ney does not exist in order to ensure that the defendant has an
attorney who will pursue whatever goal will make him or her
most content. Instead, a criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to an attorney for the limited, but extremely important,
purpose of ensuring that the defendant who is untrained in the
law is not required to defend himself or herself against the power
and legal acumen of the state when it attempts to impose a crim-
inal penalty.°3
In this regard, the fact that defense counsel's ability to yield to
a defendant's wishes may be constrained by the "constitutional
requirement""4 of effective assistance of counsel is entirely con-
sistent with the very reason that a defendant has a right to a
lawyer in a criminal trial. Indeed, "[t]he 'core purpose' of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to guarantee effective assis-
tance at trial.""2 5 In the words of one federal court, in the context
of a criminal trial, the right to "[e]ffective assistance of counsel
involves the lawyer's help to win an acquittal or lower sentence,
that is, 'vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause.""'2 6
Therefore, regardless of how the client defines the goals of the
representation, defense counsel owes the client a constitutionally
mandated duty of effective assistance of counsel, i.e., meaningful
adversarial testing,0 7 rather than a duty to pursue whatever goal
the client desires. As previously stated, in order to ensure that
the actual duty owed to the defendant is not violated, if the client
demands that defense counsel implement a decision that falls
203. Id.; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); James Tomkovicz,
The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67
N.C. L. REV. 751, 753 (1989). Tomkovicz describes the right to counsel in the following
manner:
[O]ur adversary system... contemplates a contest between opposing sides.
By nature, one of those sides is significantly more powerful in most, if not all,
relevant respects. The grant of counsel to the inherently inferior defendant is
designed to promote balanced contests by equalizing the adversaries. Counsel
brings legal expertise, knowledge of the system, tactical and strategic savvy,
and a commitment to the defense of the accused against state efforts to im-
pose a criminal penalty.
Id.
204. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
205. United States v. Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (D. Or. 2010).
206. United States v. Teagne, 953 F.2d 1525, 1537 (11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson, J., con-
curring) (rejecting the contention that effective assistance of counsel at the trial stage in-
volves other "ideas").
207. See In re Yung-Cheng Tsai, 351 P.3d 138, 142 (2015).
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outside of the range of professionally competent assistance, a
lawyer-centered approach to decision making is required.
Of course, oftentimes a client's goal may not be entirely clear,
or the client may have goals that are somewhat mixed in terms of
wanting to pursue one goal that is related to winning the case
and another that is not. At other times, clients are very clear-he
or she simply wants to be acquitted. Regardless of how the client
defines the goals of the representation, it is likely that most deci-
sions that are favored by the client will be consistent with pre-
vailing professional norms.
As explained above, because the range of what is considered
reasonable professional assistance is quite wide,2"' many times a
client's strategic preferences may be entirely consistent with the
type of meaningful adversarial testing envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment. As a result, legal commenters have noted that a
lawyer can generally defer to the client's wishes, unless doing so
requires "the lawyer to forsake 'meaningful adversary testing' of
the prosecution's case.209
C. The Client-Centered Lawyer Would Follow the Dictates of the
Sixth Amendment
The most widely utilized paradigm of client-centered counsel-
ing has failed to account for the ways in which the constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance may limit an attorney's ability to
surrender ultimate decision-making control to the client.20 In-
deed, the primary objective of this article is to fill this void in the
theory of client-centered counseling.
208. Bell v. United States, No. PJM 13-1682, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171705, at *9 (D.
Md. Dec. 9, 2014) dismissed, 599 F. App'x 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
209. LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 16, § 11.6(a) (positing that "where the client's prefer-
ence is not based on a misunderstanding of the law or an inability to understand why the
lawyer favors an alternative tactic," the lawyer can generally defer to the client's wishes if
the client's preference does not require the lawyer to "forsake 'meaningful adversarial test-
ing' of the prosecution's case"). Even if the client-centered lawyer's decision to yield to a
defendant's strategic preference was violative of Stricklands performance prong, as noted
in Part III.A.L.b, the client will not automatically prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. Unless the client can successfully argue that prejudice should be pre-
sumed pursuant to one of the exceptions provided for in United States v. Cronic, the client
would most likely be required to demonstrate that he or she was actually prejudiced by
counsel's decision to accede to the client's demand, pursuant to Strickland's prejudice
prong. See supra note 162 for a more thorough description of Strickland's prejudice prong
and the exceptions to the prejudice requirement provided for in Cronic.
210. See supra Part II.B.
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However, while failing to recognize the impact of the Sixth
Amendment, the dominant paradigm of client-centered lawyering
recognizes other lawfully imposed limitations on the application
of its decision-making philosophy.1 This is certainly the case
with respect to ethical prohibitions"' as well as in situations
where clients, either because of age or mental impairment, re-
quire that counsel exercise more decision-making control than is
typical of client-centered lawyers.213
Of course, the client-centered counselor would not directly ad-
vocate that a lawyer yield to a client's strategic demands if doing
so would otherwise be unconstitutional. The reason for this is
simple: client-centered lawyering is intended to operate within
the bounds of the law.214 In this sense, while somewhat ironic, if
overruling a client's strategic preference is necessary to ensure
compliance with the Sixth Amendment, a client-centered ap-
proach would dictate nothing different than doing so.
CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the client-centered lawyer
may defer to the defendant's wishes with respect to important
matters of trial tactics and strategy, so long as those decisions do
not cause the defense counsel to forsake meaningful adversarial
testing of the prosecution's case. In this sense, defense counsel's
decision to yield to the defendant's strategic preference is entirely
consistent with the duty of effective assistance of counsel that is
owed to the defendant.
Nevertheless, there are, in fact, times when a criminal defend-
ant will demand that a lawyer implement strategic decisions that
are not reasonable under prevailing professional norms and that
fall outside of the range of competency demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases. In such instances, the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee of effective assistance of counsel requires that the attorney
ask the client to make a different strategic choice that is reasona-
ble under prevailing professional norms. If the client refuses, the
defense attorney's constitutional obligation to provide effective
211. See Condlin, supra note 134, at 288.
212. See BINDER ETAL., supra note 11, at 323.
213. Id. at 10 n.8.
214. See Condlin, supra note 134, at 228.
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assistance of counsel requires that defense counsel adopt the law-
yer-centered model of decision making and overrule the client's
preference.
In delineating the ways in which the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel may limit an attorney's
ability to surrender ultimate decision-making control to the cli-
ent, this article has addressed what had otherwise been a blind
spot in the most widely utilized paradigm of client-centered law-
yering.

